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Abstract

Television allows an intimacy between a presidential
candidate and the public which was not available before this

technology was introduced into millions of American homes.
This can be an asset to a candidate who is adept at an
intimate, self-disclosive style (which is compatible with
television), or it can be a detriment to the candidate who
demonstrates physical signs of stress and presents a guarded
demeanor.

A candidate who understands how to manipulate the

medium of television by employing a speaking style and

mannerisms conducive to it can inspire the public's
confidence in his or her ability to lead.

Such an

understanding also helps candidates project and reinforce
the image of themselves that they have formed for voters.
In order to examine the evolution of image-making and
projection of that image through television, this thesis

will evaluate two presidential candidates, John F. Kennedy

and Bill Clinton, will be evaluated.

The thirty-year

difference between their campaigns and the well-documented
similarity between the two candidates provides a reasonable
basis for comparison.
Through an evaluation of the creation of these two

candidates' images, as well as their projection of those
images during one of the televised debates in each of their
campaigns, this thesis will show that, although the basic

IV

components of image-inaking have ri

in three

deCades--negatives are still minimized and positives are
still acGentuated--the manner in which a cahdidate ptrojects
that image in a televised preeidential campaign debate has

changed from a formal to a more informal style.

Further,

brevity of response now charaGterizes such debates.

These

chahges have been brought about by the medium of television

itself/which causes voters to b

ehgaged by image than

issues and causes candidates to place as much importance on

their image as the issues they present.

A Brief History of Political Debate
Political debate has always been at the foundation of

the American political system.

The Founding Fathers

believed a government should be accountable to its people
and devised a system of checks and balances to insure that
accountability:

"At the heart of 'checks and balances' was

a confidence in the ability of the best ideas to triumph if

strongly presented by forceful advocates in a fair forum"

(Jamieson, Presidential Debates 11).

The power and

^

necessity of a public exchange of ideas fuels American
democracy and accounts for the continual evolution of
political debate into its present form.
An examination of the history of political debate in

this country can provide a backdrop against which to assess
current political debates. , Voter expectations, government

regulations, and the rise of the broadcast media have all
contributed to the changes that have occurred since our
nation's infancy.

Initially, political debate was not as public as it is
today.

Many of the great debates of the past were not held

before an audience of voters but in the closed chambers of

the Constitutional Convention, colonial and state

assemblies, or the Congress.

When a debate was conducted

publicly, it was usually issue-oriented, such as slavery in
the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, and tariffs in the

Cleveland-Harrison election of 1888.

However, no direct

debates were held between presidential candidates at that

time, because it was considered bad manners to appeal
directly to the common voter.

The most popular method for a presidential candidate to
campaign during the 19th century was to have a surrogate do

the speaking for him.

A presidential stand-in was usually a

prominent member of Congress or a major political figure

within the state that was being targeted for votes.

This

surrogate would conduct public speeches at various locations

in which important issues and party affiliation were
emphasized.

Stephen Douglas was the first presidential candidate to
personally conduct a nationwide campaign and was widely
criticized for breaking new ground.

Minow and Sloan

document disapproval for this new style of campaigning when

they report the disparaging remarks directed at Douglas by
various newspaper reports
Douglas 'demeans himself as no other candidate
yet has,' complained one newspaper; he 'goes about
begging, imploring, and beseeching the people to
grant him his wish.' Observed another: 'Douglas

is going about peddling his opinions as a tin man
peddles his wares. The only excuse for him is
that since he is a small man he has a right to be
engaged in small business, and small business it
is for a candidate for the presidency to be
strolling around the country begging for votes
like a town constable' (6).

This quote sharply contrasts Americans' expectations of
their presidential candidates in the 19th century with what

they are today.

In the last century, national politics were

still considered to be in the domain of an elite gentry—

carefully selected pillars of the community who were

assigned to the electoral college in order to cast the best
vote for their party.

Douglas upset the status quo because

it was considered unseemly and demeaning for a member of

this gentry to be mingling with the common rabble, much less
to be beseeching them for their vote.

It was also

considered unnecessary, since he was well-known by the
members of the electoral college who would be casting their

votes.

Yet, when the reporter in the above quote wrote that

Douglas was "peddling his opinions as a tin man peddles his
wares," he captured the essence of what» American
presidential campaigning was to become.

Beginning in the

mid-20th century, the candidate would not only peddle his
opinions, but peddle himself like one of the many products
advertised on television.

Part of the underlying assumption in the creation of
the electoral college was that most Americans did not have

enough access to and knowledge of the presidential
candidates to cast an informed vote.

Only with the

appearance of broadcast media did voters begin to receive
easier access to political candidates.

Beginning with radio, political messages were, for the
first time, spoken in the prospective, voter's living room

rather than on a country stage or an auditorium.

Not only

did radio give iDoth candidates and constituency greater
access to each other, hut it also caused Gandidates to

change their message to meet the Gircumstances of this hew

forum.

When voters had to travel long distances (by walking

or using a horse and buggy) to hear a political debate on
stage, they were more likely to listen for the duration

because of the amount of effort required to attend the
event.

When radio brought political messages into the

voters' homes, however, political candidates (or their

stand-ins) were forced to give shorter, more "entertaining"
messages to keep the attention of the radio audience.

Even with the available use of radio, however,
candidates did not feel compelled to debate esch other over
the air waves.

Incumbents realized they had nothing to gain

by engaging their opponents in verbal exchanges.

Swerdlow

explains the tendency of incumbent presidents in the first

half of this century to remain secure in their position by
avoiding their opponent

...they [incumbents] follow a strategy of

minimal exposure to voter and press scrutiny....
When presidential candidates met or came close to
meeting during campaigns, the country's press and

opinion makers--in sharp contrast to their
present-day attitudes--encouraged
nonconfrOntational gentlemanly demeanor (10),

However, as more and more senatorial and presidential

candidates began using radio as a means to reach voters, the
inevitable encounters between candidates began occurring
over the air waves.

Although no presidential candidates

faced-off during an electoral campaign on radio. Republican
candidates Harold Stassen and Thomas Dewey debated on May

17, 1948 in their bid for their party's presidential
nomination.

The debate was broadcast by ABC, NBC, and Mutual radio
"to an audience estimated at between 40 and 80 million.

One

of the largest audiences in radio history had abandoned the
'Carnation Contented Hour' and Fred Waring to listen to
Stassen and Dewey" (Presidential Debates 90).

The debate

proved to be Stassen's undoing.

The significance of the Stassen-Dewey debate is that it

drew listeners into a new dimension of judging the personal
chracteristicss of the debaters, something that wasn't

relevant when listening to surrogates debate their party's
platform.

Not only was the validity of the arguments

weighed, but also the candidates' ability to respond well

under stress, appear fair and compassionate, and speak more
eloquently.

The audience was afforded a new list of factors

with which to judge the candidates,

when voters decided

which candidate to vote for according to their party's
platform, it was the content of the message that held

prominence in the voters' minds.

However, when candidates

themselves debated issues in the

voters' living rooms via

the radio, not only the message was judged, but the delivery
and believability of the candidate as well.

This new method of candidate analysis was greatly
increased with the advent of television,

when Kennedy and

Nixon engaged in the first televised presidential debates,

voters judged not only how the candidates sounded, but how
they looked and moved.

Assessment of candidates' perceived

character became more important than the issues, which were
foremost in voters' minds when candidates kept themselves

hidden from sight, sound and conflict and had surrogates

carry their case to the public.
Not only did television provide voters with more
factors with which to assess candidates, but it also created
new expectations of what candidates should be like due
solely to the technology of television.

In fact, television

has so much changed Americans' expectations of how a

political candidate should be that, according to Ranney,
"being 'good on television' has become one of the first

requirements...for being a successful candidate for
nomination and election to the presidency, a governorship, a

seat in the U.S. Senate, or any office with a constituency
that encompasses one or more television markets" (102).

The

result is that campaign managers must now have a thorough

understanding of how to work with the broadcast media in

order to present their candidates positively to the public.
But what does it mean to be "good on television"?

It

means looking good, i.e., appearing healthy and confident
which promotes confidence in the viewer.

It also means

knowing what sort of rhetorical delivery television

requires.

Ranney quotes political media specialist Tony

Schwartz, who observes that
the kind of personality, appearance, and
speaking style that inspires standing ovations
from crowds of thousands in auditoriums is quite
different from the kind that inspires liking and

confidence from a few people sitting in front of a
television set in their own homes.

The auditorium

situation calls for a commanding presence, a

strong voice projected at a high volume, large
gestures, and dramatic punch lines with plenty of
pauses for cheers.

The TV-room situation'calls

for a pleasant and friendly presence, a moderate
tone of voice, small and natural gestures, and a
general conversational manner. (103)
Thus, the candidate who speaks on television as he or she

would in a living room of a few people is more likely to
gain a favorable consensus from the public, because this

type of presentation, being more natural in a private
setting, puts Viewers at ease,

if a candidate were speaking

in a booming voice and waving his arms around, it would be
as much an affront as if this were taking place right in
front of the viewer instead Of in an auditorium.

Issues

aside, a voter would be hesitant to vote for a person to

lead the country if that candiidate did not know how to

present him^^^

for according to the situation.

Thus it is that with candidates being brought into

voters' living rooms through television, image began to
override issues in importance.

Issues were of importance

when voters did not see or heat the candidates except from a

great distance On a country stage.

When voters began to be

exposed to candidates closh up on a dail# basis throtigh
television, different judgment factors began to hold sway.

John F. Kennedy W

tbe first ptesidehtiai Cahdidate to

have a full awareness pf tbe; power Of promoting an pyetall
image of himself above any party Ol^formi

Throhgh use of

the media to promote his image, he set a precedent which
subsequent political candidates copied.

It was Kennedy's

"image-making" which, according to Brown, dissolved ''the

barriers between the private and public realms'' (70),

Brown

explains the effects of this type of campaiohihg as fo
Largely as a result of the media of mass
communication, the process of voting has become

more and more analogous to the consumer's "choice"
of commodities. Increasingiy/ to cast a vote for
a candidate is seen as an act of Self-definition

in which one seiects an ''image'' suppdsedly

Smbleinatic of one's ''iaSte'' and ''lifestyle'' (70).
Brown cites tha Kennedys as being the pioneers of the"new
politics of style" throhgh theif use of magazines and
television to turn good looks and glamour into political

:

assets.

The Kennedy campaign of image over issues set the

tone for future political campaigns.

Certainly, such emphasis on a candidate's image calls
for a new understanding of rhetoric that encompasses more

than merely a candidate's careful choice of words in

persuading voters.

This new rhetoric must also include how

a candidate is presented for public yiewihg, i.e., in what
setting a candidate is seen, with what people, for what
reason. . ■

The rhetorician Kenneth Burke has aptly framed this new
type of persuasion within his rhetorical conception of
"identification."

With this theory, candidates cause others

to identify themselves not only with what is said through

speeches, but also with what "properties" they surround
themselves with.

Burke explains the importance of the

overall image a candidate presents when he writes

For a "good" rhetoric neglected by the press
cannot be so "communicative" as a poor rhetoric

backed nation--wide by headlines.

And often we

must think of rhetoric not in terms of some one

particular address, but as a general body of
identifications that owe their convincingness much
more to trivial repetition and dull daily
reinforcement than to exceptional rhetorical
skill. (1022)

Televised presidential debates have now become the
norm.

Voters expect it, for these debates are the only time

they are allowed to judge the candidates for themselves as

they appear in a somewhat spontaneous setting, holding each
other accountable for their views.

Candidates have been known to ignore or change campaign

promises, but a person does not so easily change his or her
way of acting or being.

Thus, the televised debates provide

a setting for voters to determine how each candidate might

perform in any future situation that might occur during that

person's presidency.
As will be shown, political campaigns have become a
battle of candidate images.

A candidate's image, as well as

the candidate's personal life, is stressed over issues, and
campaign staffs' attempts to present candidates who conform

to whatever image the public expects.

The climax bf this

imags-makiug occurs during the televised presidential

debate, when carididates must, at all costs, hold onto and
project that image of themselves which has been molded to

please the public.
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An Analysis of Clinton's and Kennedy's Campaign Image
Political candidates, in order to be elected, must
assure the electorate that they are capable leaders.
Incumbents have the benefit of their track record in office

if, indeed, their actions have received favorable public
notice.

But even with a good record, a candidate must still

re-establish, in the public's eye, a position of superiority
over any new contenders for the job.

To obtain the position of frontrunner in a campaign, a

candidate must not only assure voters of his or her ability
to perform the job, but, more importantly, convey a total
image of him or herself as trustworthy, competent

likeable.

and

To this end, a campaign becomes not only a

concerted effort to reach as many voters as possible with a

candidate's message, but an image formation and promotion as
well.

A candidate's image is "created" by accentuating his or
her positives and minimizing the negatives.

How this is

done is greatly determined by the mood and expectations of
the voters during the particular time period that the
campaign is waged.

Voter expectations of a candidate that

have been determined to be most important are explained by
Jamieson

Trait-based explanations of voting tell us what
we say we look for. When asked what they liked
and disliked about the presidential contenders,
approximately one-fourth of the American public

11

has reported such personal traits as warmth,
honesty, or interiigence. Among the traits

routinely appeat

assessments of presidehtial

hopefuls are competence and integrity, of the
two, competence generally carries the greater
weight. Specific historical circumstances, such
as Watergate, can shift our focus to integrity,
however. Although the relationship may follow an

inverted U curve, we also expect presidents to be
knowledgeable (Presidential Debates 140).
Although "warmth" is not necessarily a required trait
for governing the country, a large block of American voters

view it as significiant in what they expect in a president.
Apparently, many voters would not vote for a candidate, no

rha^

how competent and trustworthy, if that candidate was

■aot/^iikeable. ':' .

.'i

John E; Kehhedy understopd tl^e importance of
e^xplained by Joseph p. Berrv. Jr. in John f. Kennedy and the
Media: The First Television President:

"When speaking in

pulDlic, Kennedy upderstopd that it is not simply 'what you
say' that counts;

'how you say it' is also important. . . .

simply stated, it is easier to persuade people to think your
way if they like you as a person" (121) .
Kathleen Hall Jamieson also stresses the importance of
image over substantive issues and qualifications when she
writes in Presidential Debates

When voters report, as they have since the early
1970s, that their voting decisions are more
influenced by the character of the candidate than
by stands on issues or party affiliation, they are
revealing, in part, the extent to which party and
promises are insufficient to allay the fears
engendered by unfdrecast policies and
unanticipated presidential behaviors. . . . (4) .
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Even Richard Nixon, after a poor showing in his

televised campaign debates with Kennedy, grasped the

importance of image over substance, saying
Unfortunately, in the television age a candidate's
appearance and style count for more than his ideas
and record.... An intelligent candidate who
follows his conscience and runs a campaign based
entirely on substance—who worries more about

getting his views across than about what color
shirt will look best on the evening news—is a
sure loser (Berry 37).

In summation of the importance of the candidate's image

over any substantive matters. Berry recommends that
candidates "create a politically sellable image; understand

that image is just as important, if not more important, than
one's stand on the issues" (147).

When a national campaign is waged by presidential
candidates, the most expedient method for creating and

promoting one's image is through the media, especially
television, since it can reach the greatest number of people
in the shortest amount of time.

Clearly, a candidate who

understands how to manipulate the medium of television in

promoting his or her image will have an advantage over any
opponents.

—

Given the peculiar demands of television in
transmitting a positive image to the modern audience, a more

contemporary definition of rhetoric is called for than the
traditional key term "persuasion" which has been assigned to
it.

Kenneth Burke expands the definition of rhetoric with

13

his theory of 'Vi!dentification/" Which^
corresponds to the rhetorical knowledge a televised

political candidate must emipldy to gain the attehtion an

.;re!Spect^?df- voters.

Burke vjrltes

/

Rhetoric is the art of per
or a study of
the means of persuasion available for any given
situation.... AS for the relation betwean

'identification' and 'persm

Well

keep it in mind that a fspeaker p
audience by the use of stylistlG identific^^
his act of persuasion may be for the purpbse of
Gs^'Stng the audience t identify itself with the
speaker's interests; ahd the speaker draws Pii

identification of interests to ests^iish rapport
between himself and his audience IThe Rhetorical

Tradition 1034).

Television must certainly be considered by late 20th

century presidential candidates to be the most potent "means
of persuasion available,'' and a study of what is effective
in this medium is necessary to achieve frontrunner status.

This medium can prbve extremely detrimental to the candidate
(such as Nix^

in the first 1960 televised debate) who does

not understahd its peduliar effect upon an audience.
The establishment of rapport, through a candidate's

presentation of his or her interests in a way that will
cause the audience to identify with those interests, is also
best done through the medium of television, due to its
ability to create a feeling of intimacy between viewer and

viewed.

Because the television audience is viewing the

14

candidate close-up in their own living room, this intimacy
is expected.

Theodore H. White echoes Burke's philosophy in a more
practical manner in The Making of the President i960 when he

writes, "To become known, to be identifiable to voters in
terms of their own gut reactions, is perhaps the most
expensive and necessary condition of American Presidential

politics" (33).
It will be shown in this chapter how both John F.
Kennedy and Bill Clinton surrrounded themselves with those

properties (as defined by Burke) which identified them with
the constituency which eventually elected them president.
Both men, along with their advisors, carried out a concerted

image-making campaign of accentuating their positives and

minimizing their negatives in order to get elected.
Although these tw<3 men are no different from other

presidential candidates who create an image of themselves
for the purpose of being elected, their situations are

intriguing because their youth, as well as other factors,
created a similarity in their image promotion, while the

thirty-year difference in their campaigns provides an

interesting contrast with which to discern evolving
differences in styles of campaign image-making.
*

*
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*

Joseph Kennedy, Sr. knew all too well that in order for
his eldest son, John Fitzgerald, to win the presidency, it
would be necessary to create a positive image of him and
broadcast it across America.

"We're going to sell Jack like

soap flakes," (Berry 42) he announced to a friend.

The

elder Kennedy realized that his son's assets (athletic,

youthful appearance; heroic war record; Pulitzer prize
winning book; name recognition; and charisma) must be

amplified, and his negative aspects (Catholic religion, poor
health, apparent lack of experience) must either be
transformed into assets or hidden.

As Berry explains it,"The media attention generated
after Kennedy's performance at the 1956 Democratic National
Convention encpuraged the senator to pursue the presidency.
Most of Kennedy's activities between 1956 and 1960 were

geared to developing a politically positive media image"
(43).

One of the biggest negative factors in Kennedy's image
to be overcome was his Catholic religion.

The country had

never elected a Catholic president, and voters were fearful

that Kennedy's allegiance to the Pope might compromise his
duties as president.

In effect, voters thought Kennedy's

election might mean that the Pope would be the de facto
leader of the U.S.

Counteracting this fear was to be

16

Kennedy's first order of business, and he met the challenge

head-'on in the West Virginia primary.

Kennedy turned the religious issue to his advantage
with a tworprgnged approach.

he needed to counteract

any fears that non-Catholics might have by presenting a

positive imag

of himself to the West Vir

voters.^

Theodore H. white describes the image-making tactic that
televisign helped effect in the primary
Up and down the roads roved Kennedy names,

brothers and sihtits all available fgr speeches
and :appearanceS; to the family names Was added the
lustrous name of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.

Above

all, over and over again there was the
handsQme, open-faced candidate on the TV screen
showing himself, proving that a Catholic wears no
horns. The documentary film on TV opened with a

cut of a PT boat apraying a; white Wake thfghgh the
black night, and kennedy was a war hero; the film

next showed the quiet ybitng man holding a book in
his hand in his own library receiving the Pulitzer
l>rize, and he was a^;s

V

the young man"

held his goldeh-cnrled daughter of two, reading to
y h^
she sat on his lap, and he was the young
father; and always, gravely, open-eyed. With a
sincerity that could not be feigned, he would
explain his own devotion to the freedom of

America's faiths and the separation otbhurch and
state (108).

In addition to the television ad, Kennedy directly
confronted the voters' fears of Catholic religion in a paid
telecast on Sunday evening. May 8th.

He used about ten

minutes of the half-hour show to discuss the religious

question.

White recalled his speech, saying, "...Kennedy

spoke from the gut.

He reviewed the long war of church on

state and state on church and that greatest of all

17

constitutional decisions:

to separate church from state.

Then, peering into the camera and talking directly to the
people of West Virginia, he proceeded, as I remember, thus:
...so when any man stands on the steps of the
Capitol and takes the oath of office of President,

he ±s bearing to support the separa^

of church

and state; he puts one hand on the Bible and
raises the other hand to God as he takes the oath.

And if he breaks his oath, he is not only
committing a crime against the Constitution, for

which the Cohgress can impeach him—and should
impeach him—but he is committing asih against
, God.

Here, Kennedy raised his hand from an imaginary Bible, as if

lifting it to God, and, repeating softly, said, 'A sin
against God, for he has sworn on the Bible' " (107-108).

Not only did Kennedy present inescapable logic in this

telecast, for those who could grasp it, he also interjected
a strong visual with attendant emotion.

It would be hard

for anyone watching him to doubt his reasoning or his
sincerity.

And, by using the Bible as a prop for this

display, he forged a bond with the strongly Protestant West
Virginians.

It was one of the strongest elements of his

Catholic religion which he could use to, in effect, tell
these voters, "I, like you, rely on the Bible in the
practice of my religion; we are the same."

The second way in which Kennedy turned the religious
issue to his advantage was to play on people's fears of

being labeled bigots.

In essence, Kennedy replaced the
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voters' fear of his Catholicism with the fear of being
referred to as bigots.

David Burner explains in John F.

Kennedv and A New Generation how Kennedy did this:

"He

brought [religion] up repeatedly, raising the issue of
bigotry in such a way as to put even nonbigots on the

defensive, as though any vote cast against him for any
reason would lead the media to label his opponents as

bigots."

Burner adds, "That Nixon's own pastor, the

Reverend Norman Vincent Peale, condemned Kennedy on
religious grounds may have gained votes for the Democratic

candidate because much of the country was viewing the

election as an exorcism, once and for all time, of political
anti-Catholicism" (47).

Jamieson explained Kennedy's tactics in turning his
religion to his advantage as follows

In a brilliantly executed transformation, Kennedy
recast questions of religion as ones of tolerance.
A vote for Kennedy became a sign of openmindedness, a vote against him a potential sign of
bigotry.... By addressing the issue of religion in
question-and-answer sessions, first with voters in
televised five and one minute ads, then by
answering queries from FDR's namesake Franklin

Roosevelt Jr. in a televised half hour exchange,
Kennedy demonstrated that he did not need to clear

his statements with either Cardinal Cushing or the
Pope and also showed that he could withstand the

pressure of scrutiny by skeptics and their standin FDR Jr.

The tension of the encounters rivetted

attention and invited identification with Kennedy
as the candidate under siege and as the champion
of such American virtues as fairness, tolerance,
equal opportunity, freedom of religion, and
separation of church and state" (Packaging... 125
126).
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The oyerwhelm^^^

Protestant West Virginians

aware that the rest of the country was watching and waiting
for their reaction to a Catholic presidential candidate,
White describes one woman he spoke to, who had switched her

yote to Kennedy, as saying, "We have enough trouble in We
Virginia, let alone to be called bigots> tog'' (108).

T^^

tactics that Kennedy employed to make his cathglicisffl woyJ^
for him, as well as the labors of his highly organized a^^
innovative grassroots volunteer organizations, won him the

■'West'-'yifginia''Primary

Four other factors entereia into the image-making
campaign of Kennedy:

his bad health, his ihexperience, his

wife, and his need to prove to be the opposite of
Eisenhower.

Kennedy's team was hoping that the careful

handling of each of these areas would create the uhdeniable
image of a leader for the American people.

Kennedy suffered a lifetime of illness/beginning in
childhgod with scarlet fever and continuing through the
years with jaundice, malaria, Addison's disease {an

adrenalin ihsufficiehcy), and a bad back which required
three operatidnsi

When Addison's disease Was finally

diagnosed> a family friend recalled that Kennedy was '^sg
sick that it was an irritation for both of them, for his

father and for himself.

It threatened to get in the Way Cf

everything they were trying to accomplish" (Parmet 192) .
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Kennedy surmised, probably correctly, that Americans

would be more responsive to a young man of vibrant health
than one who needed daily doses of DOCA to maintain a
sufficient hormonal balance and who relied on the use of

crutches to ease his back pain.

Thus, a concerted effort

was put forth to hide Kennedy's many ailments and paint a

picture of a healthy, tan, athletic young man ready to take
on the task of ruling America.

Hidden from the public were

the many pills, the reading glasses, and the crutches;
revealed, instead, was the perpetually tan face, sailing

with his wife, playing football with his family,
barnstorming the country without a hat or coat—obvious

displays of vitality.

His athleticism and energy were also

displayed in the constant retelling of his war hero efforts
when he swam for hours rescuing his crew members from the
sinking PT-109.

In describing the concealment of Kennedy's illness,
Parmet writes

Medical records were sealed and vague rumors about
Addison's could be satisfied with casual, assuring
explanations that there really was not much to it.
Photographers recorded the hatless and often

coatless vigorous-looking senator, accompanied by
a wife who obviously enhanced his portrait as a
man of accomplishments, and the writers did not
look much beyond the pictures (522).

Jamieson agrees that the public would not have favored
an unhealthy candidate for the presidency when she writes;
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Had Kennedy's illness and the nature of his

medical regimen become public knowledge in the
1960 campaign, it might have changed the outcome

of the Democratic convention and, if not, surely
would have been a widely discussed and perhaps
decisive issue in the fall election, for
Eisenhower's heart attack, ileitis, and stroke had
raised the public's consciousness of the
importance of a candidate's health (Packaging...

: ^ 138

Instead of acknowledging the seriousness of Kennedy's
disease, the Kennedy campaign relied on the televised PT 109

ads to promote JFK as a man of leadership, vigor and

endurance.

Anyone watching these ads could hot, according

to Jamieson, "seriously entertain the possibility that a man
who had survived the destruction of his FT boat, had towed
another man in the ocean for five miles, and had survived

nine days in the jungle could suffer from a supposedly
serious disease" (Packaging... 139).

. Another asset to Kennedy's image was his highly
accomplished and personable wife, Jacqueline.

Unlike other

presidents' wives who created a name for themselves after

taking up residence in the White House, she became a

sensation during the campaign due to her youth, her beauty
and her style.

Women across the country were copying her

trademark hats, hairdo and clothing.

Parmet describes

Jacqueline's benefit to her husband as follows

The Kennedy women and teas were largely superceded
by personal visits throughout the state by
Jacqueline. Appearing both with her husband as
well as alone, she was thereby introduced to
campaign politics, her French especially helpful
with the large number of Massachusetts voters of
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Canadian origin. Her fluency with Italian was an
additional asset to Kennedy among an ethnic group
somewhat cooler to his appeal (452).

Certainly, the majority of women voters in 1960 were
housewives, not polished, international figures like Mrs.
Kennedy, but their desire to look like her indicated a

desire to identify themselves with what they imagined to be
her admirable persona.

This sort of imitation of an icon

exemplified Burke's treatment of "identification" as a
methodology of "means."

One instance of how an individual might merge her

identity with a particular icon (in this case, Mrs. Kennedy)
would be to wear particular clothes or other "psychological
equivalents" (Holland 29).

Modeling oneself after

Jacqueline Kennedy was a form of bragging by her emulators
in which they nonverbally pronounced, "I look like her,
therefore I am like her."

In order to keep this Jacqueline "myth" alive,American
women who admired Mrs. Kennedy would have to vote for John
F. Kennedy so that his wife would not fade from the public
eye and, thus, dissolve their own identification with her.

This sort of rhetorical identification was a clear example
of image over substance during the 1960 campaign.

Certainly, there is no mention of any international attempt
to copy Patricia Nixon's hairstyle or clothing.

Because

John F. Kennedy used his wife's high visibility as part of
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essence, a Burkean prop,

she was one more "means of

persuasion" available to Kennedy with which to win the
voters' favor.

Brown adds credence to this phenomena of image over
substance when he writes:

"Increasingly, to cast a vote for

a candidate is seen as an act of self-definition in which

one selects an 'image' supposedly emblematic of one's
'taste' and 'lifestyle' " (70).

One negative side effect to the youthful appearance

that JFK and his wife put forth was that it strengthened the
opinion of some voters that Kennedy was too young and
inexperienced to lead the country. To counteract this

negative opinion and prove his competence, Kennedy took
every opportunity to point out that he and Nixon shared the

same number of years in public service: fourteen.

In fact,

one of the reasons that Kennedy sought to enter into the

"Great Debates" with Nixon was to prove his competency on
the issues.

Another effective tactic which Kennedy employed to
remove his too youthful image was to inform the media of his

preference for being referred to as JFK or Kennedy.

The use

of the initials JFK, of course, would draw comparisons in

the public's mind with FDR, a popular president who first
understood the impact of communicating directly with the
American people via radio.
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The careful manipulation of all of Kennedy's perceived

negative aspects (Catholic religion, bad health, apparent

inexperience) formed an image in the public's mind of a
young, handsome, athletic, brilliant and charismatic young
leader.

Time magazine, in listing his attributes,

solidified this image for the country
So far. Jack Kennedy has gone on some of the most
highly visible assets in U.S. politics. At 40, he
is trim...and boyishly handsome, with a trademark
in the shock of unruly brown hair.... He belongs
to a legendary family that surpasses its
legend.... He is an authentic war hero and a
Pulitzer-prizewinning author.... He is an athlete
(during World War II his swimming skill saved his
life and those of his PT-boat mates); yet his
intellectual qualifications are such that his
photographer wife Jacqueline remarks...; 'If I
were drawing him, I'd draw a tiny body and an
enormous head.'... No stem-winding orator...,
Kennedy instead imparts a remarkable quality of
shy, sensemaking sincerity..." (Dec. 2, 1957, 18).

As a result of JFK's careful attention to his image
campaign as much as, or more than, his attention to issues,
the reaction of the people to him resembled the same
frenzied adoration reserved for Hollywood stars.

Time. in

the same article, felt obliged to describe the hysteria

toward Kennedy in this way;

"...Jack Kennedy has left

panting politicans and swooning women across a large spread

of the U.S" (17).

The same article mentioned a University

of Minnesota student who gave Kennedy a message at a Young
Democrats' Convention from her fifty-eight sorority sisters;
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"Every girl told me to give Senator Kennedy all her love and
to tell him they should all vote for him" (17).

Theodore H. White personally witnessed the celebrity
phenomenon that Kennedy inspired and describes the crowd
adulation as follows

One remembers being in a Kennedy crowd and

suddenly sensing far off on the edge of it a

ripple of pressure beginning, and the ripple,
which always started at the back, would grow like
a wave, surging forward as it gathered strength,
until it would squeeze the front rank of the crowd
against the wooden barricade, and the barricade

would begin to splinter;.... one remembers groups
along the road waving, the women unbinding
kerchiefs from their heads to wave.... one

remembers the grabbers, bursting through police
lines, trying to touch him or reach him, and the
squeezers who grasped his hand.... One remembers,
of course, the jumpers.

The jumpers made their

appearance shortly after the first TV debate when

from a politican Kennedy had become, in the mind
of the bobby-sox platoons, a "thing"

combining... 'the best qualities of Elvis Presley
and Franklin D. Roosevelt' (330-331).

White also provides evidence of the great contrast

between Nixon's and Kennedy's effect upon an audience during
speaking engagements when he writes: "...out of doors the

Nixon crowds were incomparably more subdued than the Kennedy
crowds.

Kennedy evoked an excitement, a response to

personality.

Nixon held his crowds earnestly together in a

sober, intent frowning mass" (332).

Berry offers one possible explanation for Kennedy's
great appeal when he writes, "Why did Kennedy's appearance
create so much attention?

The three presidents prior to
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himj Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower, were balding older
In comparison to them, Kennedy^s youth and svelt good

looks made him seem even more attiractive than he Was" (51).
In fact, Kennedy did attempt tb create a greet gfulf in
the minds of Americans between his style and that of

Eisenhower.

Rbbett G. Carlton, when writing about KeJ?^®'3;y,

his desire to distance himseif from Eisehhbwer in
^thiS:'- way

:
From FDR he learned what to do, from Eisenhower he

leaifned what to avbid:.... He had Watched the
former presideht on television for eight years; he
greatiy disapproved of what he saw. In
particular^ he thought pictures of Eisenhower

golfing undermined his dignity, prolecting an
:v;;-'image'pf 'irivbliiy,
^

Although JFK thoroughly enjoyed playing golf> he would allow
no pictures to be taken of him en

in this pastime in

order to preyent any asspciatibns of himSelf^^^^^^W
in the public's mind.

Eisenhower

Berry reinforces Carlton's comments,

saying, "...golf playing evoked images of Eisenhower's
sluggish country club days at the White House where he

dented the floors with his golf shoe spikes" (62).
Parmet offers an even more intriguing contrast between

Eisenhower and Kennedy when he explains the differences in
the associates of these two leaders

Interviewing Ike's associates invariably evokes
laudatory comments: praise for his geniality,
kindness, humanity, temperance.

But the common

denominator centered on his love for the country
and value to America, his sense of duty, and his
ability to bind the wounds of the early 1950s just
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as he had handled delicate wartime alliances....

Kennedy intimates, equally loyal, sometimes
feverishly so, guard his memory in a 'cult of the
individual' fashion. Emphasizing his brilliance,
charm, wit, sophistication, he--rather than the
country—becomes the center of value. Eisenhower
presided over an institution; Kennedy, in his very
brief reign, was the institution (xvi).
Not,all Americans responded to the celebrity appeal of

Kennedy and some, in fact, questioned the place of such
mindless hysteria in the consideration of a candidate's

worthiness for office.

Parmet quotes William V. Shannon of

the New York Post as writing in the Nov. 11, 1957 issue
There is a growing tendency on the part of
Americans to 'consume' political figures in much
the same sense we consume entertainment

personalities and in the movies.... Month after

month, from the glossy pages of Life to the
multicolored cover of Redbook. Jack and Jackie

Kennedy smile out at millions of readers; he with
his tousled hair and winning smile, she with her
dark eyes and beautiful face. We hear of her
pregnancy, of his wartime heroism, of their
fondness for sailing. But what has all this to do
with statemanship? (438).
The tendency of Americans to bestow "star status" on
their presidential candidates has not diminished with time.

Thirty years after Kennedy won over America, Bill Clinton
appeared, almost as a reincarnation of the young Kennedy.
Comparisons between the two were rampant. There was even a

photograph of President Kennedy shaking hands with the
unknown sixteen year old Bill Clinton on the White House

lawn.

After Clinton's election, Howard Fineman drew

attention to the importance of the photograph when he called

it "...prophetic history.

For it documents JFK reaching
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history.

For it documents JFK reaching across the years to

a boy he did not know—and to whom the torch of leadership
now passes in an emphatic statement of America's desire for

change" (5).
Bill Clinton, like Kennedy, waged a campaign of
accentuating his positives and minimizing his negatives.
Clinton's journey to the White House, however, involved

overcoming some of the most damaging, scandalous press that
any presidential candidate has had to face in recent

history.

Joe Klein described Clinton's campaign, calling

him "a remarkably skilled and resilient politican, a man of
persistence and intelligence who has managed to survive a

personal ordeal unlike any other in the history of
presidential campaigning and showed more than his share of
grace under pressure in the process" (23).

Indeed, Clinton, like Kennedy, managed to make the bad
aspects of his image work for him to obtain more votes.

Unlike Kennedy, however, who entered the race already

knowing his detriments and with a battle plan for dealing
with them, Clinton was taken by surprise when a probing
press and a Republican party on the attack defined for him
what he needed to address.

Three major negative factors which threatened Clinton's

promotion of his leadership image during his campaign were:

(1) Gennifer Flowers' allegations of a twelve-year affair
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activities; and (3) Clinton's image as a "waffler"—saying
anything to please anybody.

This third factor,

surprisingly, was the most damaging of all, because it
referred not to an activity, but to Clinton's basic

character.

The American people might side with Clinton in

his explanation of the adultery and draft-dodging scandals,
but they would not come to support him if they believed his
basic character was flawed.

Clinton's indecisiveness was

called "the character problem" by his staff and became the
focus for their image upgrade of Clinton.
On January 23, 1992, the tabloid Star broke "the

Gennifer Flowers story" in which she described a twelve-year
affair with Clinton.

This was the first devastating blow to

the Clinton campaign, and one that would have to be dealt

with immediately and directly before the campaign could
continue with the New Hampshire primary.

Clinton's staff

knew, of course, that the most direct and immediate route to

the greatest number of Americans was through television, and
they chose two popular television shows to try to lay the
Flowers rumor to rest.

First, Mandy Grunwald, one of Clinton's advisors, went
on "Nightline."

Newsweek reported:

"She so thoroughly

pinned Ted Koppel's ears back on trash-for-cash journalism
that even the Great Stone, Face had to admit he felt a bit

defensive" (Nov/Dec 1992, 33).

30

Then, Clinton and his wife

Hillary were offered a prime time spot on "60 Minutes" right
after the Super Bowl.

At first, Clinton feared that his use

of this news show would justify the coverage of the Flowers
rumor by the legitimate press.

But James Carville,

Clinton's campaign manager, argued that it would be better

to confront the issue immediately, rather than waiting for
the fall.

When the Clintons appeared before the cameras that

evening, they were well prepared and actually turned the

Flowers rumor around to their advantage, because not only
were they able to dispel the Flowers rumor in many people's
minds, they were also able to show the American people who
they were and gain newfound fame overnight.

The other four

Democratic presidential candidates were powerless against
this prime time opportunity to say, "Regardless of the
issues in this campaign, this is who I am!"
Another significant factor to this television
appearance was the emergence of the candidate's wife as a

character in her own right and, although the opposition
viewed her as a dangerous, outspoken woman, many voters
across the country identified with her strength and clarity
and viewed her as a positive for Clinton.

It is true that

Hillary Clinton attempted to downplay her strength as a
professional and capable woman in order to assuage and
attract the more conservative voters who were afraid of her
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forwardness.

But she already had a strong following among

voters who were ready for a "new type" of First Lady who
would do more than redecorate the White House and change the
china pattern.

An interesting comparison can be made between Hillary
Clinton and Jacqueline Kennedy.

Both were considered to be

a new type of potential First Lady when they made their
public debut, yet the novelty of each woman (Jacqueline's
youth and trendsetting style and Hillary's professionalism)
was highly restricted by the time period in which they

operated.

Both Kennedy's and Clinton's use of their wives

as "Burkean props," attracted voters to them who identified

with the type of woman they represented.
The television appearance by the Clintons was a success

due to Hillary Clinton.

According to Hohenberg, "Hillary

Clinton, apparently, made the difference.

For by standing

up for her husband and defending both their marriage and the

future of their daughter, Mrs. Clinton helped make him [her
husband] a national figure" (5).

In contrast to Hillary's

high profile, the wives of the other four candidates were

practically unknown.
But the truth of the rumored affair was still unknown.

Not even Clinton's staff would approach him directly about

it, because they secretly feared it was true since he had
never denied it.

During the taping of the "60 Minutes"
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important was the Nixon-Kennedy debate, and I like to think
we helped create a president.

I'd like to think we'll do it

again" (Newsweek Nov/Dec 1992, 34).

Hewitt's use of the

word "create" is significant, since it shows that he
attributed a candidate's success to the "creation" of that

candidate by the television media.

Since the veracity of Flowers' claims was still

unclear, she called a press conference and offered tapes to
the media of alleged telephone conversations between herself

and Bill Clinton.
verifying them.

to fight back.

Then CBS and ABC played segments without

Once again, Clinton's staff used television

"We're going to have to go to war,"

announced Clinton's campaign manager, James Carville, and he
went on the "Today" show the next day "to attack the

credibility of Flowers and the media coverage" (Newsweek.
Nov/Dec 1992, 34).

The Gennifer Flowers scandal was finally laid to rest
when it was discovered that the tapes had been doctored.

The effect of the affair upon voters was determined by an
ABC poll which "found that the scandal had swayed only 11
percent of the voters; 79 percent said the press had no

business poking through such dirty laundry; 82 percent
thought enough had been said about Clinton's personal life"
(Newsweek. Nov/Dec 1992, 34).

33

The widespread coverage of the Flowers affair by the
press was indicative of an important change that occurred in
the thirty years between Kennedy's and Clinton's
presidential campaigns.

As soon as Gennifer Flowers told

her story, journalists raced to spread this news about
Clinton via newspapers and television.

However, even though

Kennedy's philandering was well-known among journalists
during his campaign and presidency, they did not report this
area of his life to the American public.

Brown, in his

discussion of revisionist history, notes that "rumors of

sexual misconduct by Kennedy had been rife in Washington
during his lifetime" (71).
Even Kennedy's liaison with Inga Arvad, who accompanied

Hitler to the 1936 Berlin Olympic games, was left untouched
by the press.

Parmet reports that, if Kennedy's lengthy and

intimate relationship with Arvad had been revealed, "it

could easily have reignited doubts about [Joe Kennedy, Sr.]
and the Nazis and, by extension. Jack and Joe McCarthy....
Although no evidence of her spying had actually been

uncovered, her close associatipns with leaders of the Third
Reich could have provided first-rate ammunition for Jack's
enemies...." (522).

Perhaps the journalists in the 1960s did not report
Kennedy's intimate activities because Kennedy enjoyed such a
good relationship with them, always providing them with
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Perhaps the journalists in the 1960s did not report

Kennedy's intimate activities because Kennedy enjoyed such a

good relationship with them, always providing them with
helpful information, granting them special favors and
looking out for their comfort.

The lack of women reporters

during Kennedy's campaign might have been another reason for
failure to take offense at Kennedy's philandering.

There

was also, in the early 1960s, still an overriding innocence
in the way citizens viewed their president, and digging into
a candidate's private life was considered taboo, if not
unnecessary.

Parmet captures this national optimism when he

writes

The civil-rights movement had yet to peak,....
Television sets were still to show police dogs,
fire hoses, and cattle prods being used against
citizens demonstrating for the right to be
citizens. Cities had not begun to burn and, to
most Americans, Indochina was indistinguishable
from China, which at least everyone knew was Red.
When the President spoke, people listened and
believed, even if they weren't inspired.
Meanwhile, the Washington press corps happily
subsisted on authorized handouts and confined

knowledge of naughty behavior to whispers in
fraternal gossip sessions. Few looked for a Deep
Throat (522).
After successfully reducing the alleged Flowers affair
to what appeared to be an insignificant rumor, Clinton next
had to turn his attention to a Wall Street Journal article

charging him with dodging the draft during the Vietnam War.

ABC then exposed a letter from a 23-year-old Clinton to the
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drafted were high; then, when the lottery was instituted and
he drew a high number, he requested the ROTC chief to remove
his name from the ROTC program.
A heroic war record is one factor that could still be

considered a positive accomplishment for a candidate in the

thirty year span between Kennedy's and Clinton's campaign.
In fact, when comparing these two men, it is ironic that
Kennedy's connection with the military was superbly positive

while Clinton's was incredibly negative.

Damage-control on

Clinton's image was clearly called for.
After Clinton's draft dodging became public, the

candidate was immediately besieged by questions about his

patriotism and whether or not he thought he was capable of
serving as commander-in-chief if elected president.

Clinton^s^^^

thought it best to meet the attack head-

on as they had with the Flowers affair, urging him to
restate his opposition to what he believed to be an

unjustified war.

Clinton, however, attacked the press for

trying to tear him down and defended himself without

approaching the issue directly.

Newsweek reported

The attack concealed a sharp twinge of
embarrassment, if not guilt; on Clinton's part>
He was from the Southl; he hhd grown up within its
tradition of military service. If ani^thlng,^^^^ ^

friends said, he was far more touchy over the
dfhft than he had ever been about Gennifer
Flowers. The candidate's evasiveness ;as to the
details of his draft record probably hurt him more
than not having served in Vietnam (Nov/Dec 1992,
34).
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friends said, he was far more touchy over the
draft than he had ever been about Gennifer

Flowers.

The candidate's evasiveness as to the

details of his, draft record probably hurt him more

than not having served in Vietnam (Nov/Dec 1992,
34).

Hohenberg, who viewed Clinton's handling of the issue
in a more positive light, wrote

Clinton's response was that he had had a high
draft number, which was true. Moreover, when the
accusation was viewed against the antiwar
sentiment of many of the college students and

other youth of his generation, the draft-dodging
charge also failed to impress a lot of people
across the land (5).

It did not seem to affect the voters in New Hampshire
who gave him second place to Paul Tsongas' win there.
Clinton had managed to minimize the negative effects of
adultery and draft-dodging and was still in the race.

But these negative issues did stick with many voters as
evidence that Clinton was capable of evasiveness when clear
answers were called for, and that his ability to command
America's military was questionable.

Clinton's lack of directness on the draft question

revealed a character flaw that the voters were quick to pick
up on—his tendency to "waffle," to change or redefine his
statements to please whomever he was talking to.

Newsweek

reports that Clinton's staffers employed modern marketing
techniques by assembling a focus group of ten women and

asking what they thought of Clinton: " 'He just goes with
the flow,' said one panelist.

'If you asked his favorite
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color he'd say "Plaid".'

(Afterward, whenever Clinton

fudged, his staffers said he'd gone 'plaid.')" (Nov/Dec 40).

Even after the Democratic National Convention, when
Clinton and Gore entered the campaign trail together,
"Carville said they had to be careful not to look too
political or slick. 'Watch the"plaid" problem,' he reminded

them: anything that made Clinton look like he was offering
everything to everyone would be a disaster" (Newsweek.

Nov/Dec 1992, 78).

" 'Specificity,' George stephanopoulos,

Clinton's communications director, said in New Hampshire,
'is a character issue this year' " (Klein 15).

In order to combat the character prbblem that resulte<i
from Clinton's perceived desire to want to please everyone,
his staff launched "The Manhattan Project."

This program's

goal was to research, through focus groups, and reform

Clinton's image in response to various national polls.

What

it did, in effect, was determine what the American people
wanted and then mold the candidate to meet that desire.

Clinton was, indeed, the modern presidential candidate in

every sense of the word.

His advisors used well-known

marketing techniques to discover what sort of candidate was

wanted and then employed television to project that image to
the greatest number of people in the shortest amount of
time.
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Marketing techniques were not used thirty years

previously in Kennedy's campaign because they had not yet
been refined.

Focus groups had just come into use after

World War II but were not yet considered scientific enough

to be used successfully.

Kennedy did make full use, however

of Lou Harris and his polling techniques.

During the

presidential campaign, Harris would first determine who the

winner of a primary would be and then find out why Kennedy
would theoretically win or lose the race depending upon the

results of the survey.

If Kennedy came up the loser, his

team would then determine why, then attempt to overcome the
negative factor in Kennedy's image.

For instance, Harris polled West Virginians in June

1958 and discovered that they would vote 52% for Kennedy,
38% for Nixon, balance undecided.

In April 1960, however,

the poll revealed 60% for Humphrey, 40% for Kennedy.

When

Kennedy advisors requested of pollsters an explanation for

the great difference in the two poll results, they were told

that no one knew Kennedy was Catholic in 1958.

Thus,

Kennedy conducted most of his West Virginia campaign by
dealing with the issue of his religion.
What Clinton's advisors' research revealed was that

college-educated women, in particular, were suspicious of
Clinton and considered him no more than a mere politician.
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moving an electronic needle on a scale: 0-50 indicates

frigid to cool, 50-100 indicates cool to hot.

Newsweek

reports

Greenberg...studied a group of 26 moderate to

slightly liberal white women; only six were mildly
impressed by Clinton. But when he said things
like, 'No more something for nothing," the needles
moved up. When he talked about keeping kids in
school, the needles flicked to 60. Getting w
welfare recipients off the rolls in two years
produced a 75-point spike* {Nov/Dec 42).

After several focus groups showed similar results, the
Clinton team decided to run the campaign message as a

simplified version of the Manhattan Project:

People First,

with a strong dose of Responsibility.

As this vision expanded into reality during several
staff sessions, it became clear what Clinton must do.

Newsweek reported the results from one of the meetings
'We need to mention work every 15 seconds,'
offered Carville. Warming to the theme, Grunwald
said, 'by the end of the convention, what do we
want people to know about Clinton: that he worked
his way up; that his life's work had been in

education and investing in people; that he values
work; that he had moved people from welfare to
work; that he has a national economic strategy to
put America back to work.' Carville chimed in,
'The word "work" works for us. There are no quick
fixes, no hoaxes, no easy answer. We have to work
our way out of this mess' (Nov/Dec 42).

The economy was on a downward trend; people were being
pushed out of middle-management jobs by computers and wanted
work; people wanted others to work, as well, rather than
receive an easy welfare income from the government.
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And if

Clinton had worked so hard to get himself where he was in
life, the voters might have surmised, then he would

understand their situation and help them.

Clearly, this was

a case of word usage; that Burke would describe as a strong

identification factor for Clinton's constituency.

They

identified with the message that was being put forth, and
they identified with the candidate.

Because Clinton placed

his interests alongside those of his constituency, he had

achieved social agreement with the voters through the
rhetoric of "identification" as defined by Burke.

When the

candidate is able to show the voters "that his interests and

attitudes and theirs are consubstantial, and that,
consequently, the solutions which offers are identified with

their interests" (Holland 38), then he has gained their
confidence and, possibly, their vote.

Besides the strong message that Clinton developed, he
counteracted his image as a "waffler" by employing what his

advisors called "counterscheduling," giving an unpopular
message to particular groups to prove that he was a strong,
independent thinker, not out to please anyone in order to
get votes.

This technique would also assure voters that

Clinton could stand up for his principles, regardless of
what the consequences were.

A prime example of this counterscheduling occurred when
Clinton spoke to Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and
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get votes.

This technique would also assure voters that

Clinton could stand up for his principles, regardless of
what the consequences were.

A prime example of this counterscheduling occurred when
Clinton spoke to Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and

attacked Sister souljah (a rap singer) for suggesting that
blacks should stop killing each other and concentrate on

killing whites for awhile.

By delivering an unpopular

message in person to his black audience, Clinton gathered a
greater number of votes from suburban whites who saw the

televised version of his speech in their living rooms that
night.

It was a case of sacrificing a smaller number of

votes to receive a far greater number of votes.

By not

delivering the message the Rainbow Coalition was expecting,
Clinton proved the worth of his character to many American
voters.

Kennedy's negatives did not spring from character

issues ("waffling") or activities (alleged affairs, draft

dodging) as Clinton's did., Rather, the negatives Kennedy
suffered from sprung from who he was:
inexperienced Catholic with bad health.

a rich, young,
He did not need

damage-control to appear capable of delivering strong
messages or innocent of wrongful deeds.

Kennedy needed

damage-control to conceal or re-work what he was born with.

If the press of thirty years ago had reported Kennedy's
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philandering, then comparisons between the two candidate's
survival of bad press could be more closely aligned.

What

is apparent though, is that both Kennedy and Clinton were
noteworthy in their determination and success at overcoming
strong negative image factors in their campaigns..
After Clinton won the nomination at the Democratic

National Convention, he began riding a wave of momentum that
culminated in his election as President of the United

States.

Three factors contributed to the energy of the

Clinton campaign after the convention:

(1) choosing Gore as

vice presidential running mate; (2) participating in the bus

tours; and (3) immediately meeting Republican challenges
head-on.

By choosing Gore as his running mate, Clinton defined
his campaign as a generational and regional one.
were young and both were from the South.

Both men

Morrow described

their combined force as follows

Clinton's selection of Al Gore to be his running
mate suggested something of the energy that might
be released—a sort of sibling synergy. The
ticket of Clinton and Gore violated traditional

political rules demanding geographical balance and
even a sort of, personality contrast between a
party's two nominees. The very similarity of
Clinton and Gore in generation and regional accent
produced a powerful twinning effect—policy wonks
in a buddy movie: Butch and Sundance (25).

An additional positive in a year in which "Family

Values" were touted by both parties as being all important,
was the image projected by the Gore and Clinton families.
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Hohenberg also noted the visual power of the two
families as follows

In a response to Republican concern about [family
values], Mrs. Gore and three of their four
children often took to the campaign trail with the
Senator and Governor Clinton. With them, usually,
were Hillary Clinton and the Clinton's twelve
year-old daughter, Chelsea, making a colorful
showing of family values on the Democratic

side.... To match such a show of virility and
enthusiasm, the Bushes were obliged to enlist the
help of their grandchildren as well as the younger
vice president and Mrs. Quayle (65).
In order to counteract President Bush's well-financed

television campaign, the vitality of the Clinton/Gore family
merger was also utilized by Clinton staffers in a low-

budget, attention-grabbing ploy: the Bus Tours.

Newsweek

caught the effect that coverage of the tours had upon the
public when it reported

The route offered 1,000 miles of getting-to-know
you time against a backdrop of irresistible photo
ops: those three guys out in a field with a giant
Clinton-Gore banner draped across their combine,
that family on the front yard in lawn chairs, the
kids waving sparklers. At stop after stop. Gore
would step out and warm up the crowds. Hillary
and Tipper would hug like sorority sisters
(Nov/Dec 78).

At the end of the bus tours, polls showed that Clinton

scored higher than Bush on family values.

The media coverage that the Clinton team had hoped for

with these energetic bus tours was exuberant, prolific and
effective. The image presented by the combination of the

Clinton and Gore families sweeping America was of young.
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energetic, positive politicans ready to revamp America.
Kennedy presented this same image.

He was young and

energetic, and momentum was built for his campaign by the
support of his many family members giving speeches and teas

within any geographic area he was visiting.

But, in order to sustain the positive wave of energy
generated by the bus tours, the Clinton campaign needed a
solid foundation.

"Momentum is not message," announced

Clinton's analyst Grunwald (Newsweek. Nov/Dec 79).

And this

is when James Carville organized what he called the "War
Room."

Its main focus was to keep tabs on Bush, media

reports, and inside rumors to determine any forthcoming
attacks on Clinton and to be ready with an immediate
counterattack.

Hohenberg described the results when he

wrote

Once the White House assault began on [Clinton's]
character, he slammed back sometimes with two
blows for one. The governor and his hard-working
staff had perfected a system of prompt responses
to anything that came out of Republic headquarters
or the White House. If the president called
Clinton 'weak-kneed,' a 'knpw-nothing' and 'not to
be trusted,' the name-calling also mounted on the
Democratic side that the president was
'irresponsible,' 'pitiful,' and 'afraid to debate
the issues' (122).

It was an effective tactic, and further strengthened

Clinton's image as man who could deal effectively with any
problem that came his way.

The immediate responses also had

a negative effect upon the opposition, making the
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Republicans look desperate and ineffectual in their attacks
upon Clinton.

Once Kennedy and Clinton had proved to the voters that

they were energetic, trustworthy, and capable of leading the
nation, they chose to project and prove this image through
national televised debates with their opponents.

It was in

these debates that the American people would be given a
chance to scrutinize their chosen candidate in a way that
was not allowed by any of the news reports or televised
sound bites they had been exposed to thus far.
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A Rhetorical Analysis and Comparison of a Televised
Presidential Debate from 1960 and 1992

Clinton and Kennedy created an image of themselves byassessing the voters' expectations of what was needed in a

candidate, then minimizing their negatives and accentuating
their positives to meet that need.

By understanding what

voters expected, then using images, words and props to
create an image with which the voters could identify,
Clinton and Kennedy held an advantage over their opponents

which led to their election.

One of the most important

means for Clinton and Kennedy to project their created image
to the public was through the televised presidential
debates.

Clearly, the candidate who understood the medium

best would have an advantage over his opponents.

Since the first Kennedy-Nixon debate in 1950 had proven
so convincingly the power of image over substance, much
analysis and study had gone into the effect of television on
viewers.

Thus, Clinton, Bush and Perot had the advantage of

thirty-two years of television experience with which to
project their image to millions of voters.

Yet Clinton

seemed to have the advantage over his opponents in the
second presidential debate, perhaps because he had chosen an
innovative format which he felt more comfortable with than
the other two candidates.

The second presidential debate of 1992 occurred the
evening of October 15th at the University of Richmond in
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Richmond, Virginia.

The Republican incumbent. President

George Bush, was present along with the Democratic candidate

Bill Glinton and independent candidate Ross Perot.

Although

Ross Perot charmed viewers with his homespun "folksy" wisdom

and delighted reporters with his talent for spouting
humorous one-liners that could be repeated in the evening

hewsr he cduld not be considered a serious threat to either
Clinton or Bush, each of whose main concern was obviously

with the other.

He was, however a wild card who could do

damage if his sudden rise in popularity were not properly
understood.

U.S. News & World Report described the role

Perot played, thus:

"His folksy directness only reinforced

the sense that Clinton and Bush were sidestepping difficult

issues and that politics as usual would not do" (Oct. 26,
1992, 43).
Therefore, Clinton and Bush treated Mr. Perot

deferentially throughout the debate, attempting to align
themselves with him as a friend rather than a foe.

On one

occasion during the second debate. Bush said, "Like.Mr.
Perot, I...."

In another instance, Clinton stated, "...I

think Mr. Perot and I agree on this...."

Obviously, neither

Clinton nor Bush wanted to alienate Perot's supporters,

hoping to garner support from, them if Perot dropped out of
the race again.
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Bill Clinton's main concern in this second debate>
in the other 1992 presidential debates, was to persuade
voters that he was the obvious choice to be elected

president in the upcoming elections.

In order to do this,

he had to maintain and strengthen the image he had created

during his campaign by proving that his knowledge on

important issues dembristtated his competence to lead,
despite the fact that he was in his early forties and had
only been involved in politics at the state level.
Clinton also had to convince voters that he was

trustworthy by coming out with strong, definitive statements
on the issues, thereby further dispelling his negative image
as a "waffler."

The strong, fact-based statements that

Clinton put forth in the debate also added to his competency
factor.

Additionally, he would continue to carry the

campaign theme "People First" into the debate arena by

encouraging individual responsibility, but also by showing
that ordinary people count.

Clinton obviously wanted to

give the impression, during the debates, that the concerns

and opinions of every voter were important to him and would
continue to be so if he were elected president.

Clinton understood the public's growing dissatisfaction
with the excesses of Congress.

Self-importance was held in

low regard by voters in the fall of 1992.

It explained, in

part, Perot's rapid gain in popularity, since he portrayed
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liimself as an outsiijer who W'as going to go to washlngtoh to
"fix it."

It also partly explained Reagan's popularity when

he was president.

As Jamiesoh explains it: "Where Nixon

spoke as The President and Johnson as Your President, Reagan
[spoke] as a neighbor who steppsd out of a shower one
eyening to find that he had been asked to lead the country
for a while" (Eloquence 158).

Because the 1992 voters Were increasingly distrustful
of "Washington insidersy" feelihg they were out of touch the
needs of working Americans, the ability to distance one's

self from Washington, while seeking the nation's highest
office there, became a distinct assets

Therefore, Clinton

proposed a "talk show" style format for the second debate in

which the au^iepce members would ]^ose questions to the
candidates, thus giving the impression that he believed

ordinary citizens were ihtelligent enough to ask questions
of future presidents.

The stage props were also less formal

(bar stpofs with small ta^

next to them to hold notes and

glasses of water) thahthe Previously used podiums.
Carole Simpson, an ABC reporter who moderated this
debate, mentioned in her introduction that Bill Clinton had

proposed the format and Clinton himself reiterated this fact
later in the debate in his answer to a questioner who

wondered why the candidates couldn't stop "trashing each

othef" and just try to find the ba
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for the

issues.

Clinton responded:

"...I believe so strongly in

the question you asked," he said, "that I suggested this

format tonight.

I started doing these formats a year ago in

New Hampshire, and I found that we had huge crowds because

all I did was let people ask questions and I tried to give
very specific answers" (Reuter 16:17).
In this answer, Clinton not only stressed the

importance that the opinions of "real people" have for him,
but he also stressed the significance of his involvement in

bringing about this revolutionary format, thus insinuating
that Bush and Perot had not actively sought the opinions of
ordinary people or been innovative enough to suggest such a
format themselves.

This indictment of his competitors made

them appear guilty by omission.
It is obvious that Clinton chose a debate format in

which he excelled and which he probably realized would cause
Bush to falter.

Perhaps the genius of Clinton's choice of

this format was displayed when a young black woman asked the
candidates how the national debt had affected them

personally.

William F. Buckley, Jr. reported, "...a whole

lot of time was spent trying to cope with the question in

such a way as not to hurt the feelings of the questioner,
and so appear to be brusque and unfeeling" (70).

More than any other question in the second debate, this
one appeared to cause Bush's worst moment and Clinton's
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best.

Mr. Perot volunteered to answer the question first

and did an adequate job of taking the questioner's feelings
iiitg account while stating that the debt had caused him to
enter the presidential race.

called upon by Carole Simpson to give
his answer, but she interrupted him four times before he had

said two sentences, clarifying that he must describe his own

persohal expebien^
to Bush,

"You personally," she kept repeating

Finally,^ B

obviously floundering, uttered what

had to be the most damaging sound bite of the campaign:

''I'm not sure I get...help me with the question and I'll try
to answer it" (Reuter 16:30).

This statement caused the Clinton team to immediately
race around their command post forging that moment into a
damaging indictment of Bush.

Their method of attack is

described by Rosenstiel

It was irrelevant that the woman confronting
Bush had probably meant to ask how the recession

had affected Bush rather than the national debt,
and that her imprecision, not the economy, was
what had stumped the less-than-nimble President.
What mattered was the black outline of

recollection: A citizen asked Bush about the

economy and he didn't understand the question.
The moment reinforced exactly what was driving the
election—that Bush was out of step. If Clinton's
team could get the press to repeat their talking
point, and replay the video of that moment over
and over in the days after this October 15 debate,
they would define what this moment came to mean
and trap Bush with his own words.
Within minutes Clinton campaign headquarters in
Little Rock had written up the "Talking Points"

and faxed them to both the group in Virginia and

52

the fifty state offices to use. The document
began, " 'I'm not sure I get it,' said Bush"
(304).

Not only was Bush portrayed as "not getting" the

economy in answering this question, he also portrayed
himself as one who does not "get" the troubles of the

ordinary American, which would be severely damaging to how
voters perceived him.

U.S. News and World Report, in

forecasting what sort of difficulties might occur during the
second debate, reported

"When you have a sincere person asking a weird,
off-the-wall question," says a prominent political
consultant, "your candidate tends to give a weird,
off-the-wall reply." And viewers have a natural
sympathy for citizen questioners—who are seen as
more in tune with everyday concerns (Oct. 19,
1992, 11).
Yet Clinton's response to this questioner was

undoubtably one of his best moments during this debate and
gave viewers the impression that he was deeply concerned for

the ordinary citizen, verifying the "People First" theme of

his campaign.

He had prepared himself well for this sort qf

situation before the debate.

Carville had advised Clinton

to " '...use the audience—make the audience your friend.'
....'Tone and body language are important,' Clinton said as

he calculated the best fighting stance to take against Bush"
(Newsweek. Nov/Dec 1992, 91).
The Newsweek article goes on to describe Clinton's
response to the woman:
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Body language well prepared, Clinton moved in
toward the young woman, established eye contact
and talked warmly about how much pain the national

debt caused in^^^va small state like Arkansas, where
the governor personally knew people who lost their
jobs when companies went bankrupt. Clinton
connected" (91).
Clinton first of all questioned the woman in a

concerned tone, "Tell me how it's affected you again."
"Um..." the woman replied.

"You know people who've lost

their jobs and lost their homes?" he asked.
uh*^huh,'' she said/

He

"Well, yeah,

explained that because his state

is so small, "when people lose their jobs, there'safgood
chance

by their names."

Clinton also said

that during the last thirteen months of his campaign, he had
met many people "like you" all over America who had lost

their jobs (Reuter 16:30).
It is ironic that, although superficially, Clinton's

answer showed that he was leSs personally affected by the
poor economy than the other two candidates, it seemed that

he w^ the most affected because he cared more for others'
who were affected by it.

Perot's family had suffered

because he decided to run for President to fix the economy;
Bush had heard of and talked to those who lost their jobs

and money had come out of his own pocket because
"everything's more expensive;" Clinton knew people by name
who had lost their jobs.

Yet what the American people saw

on television (and could not see by listening to the radio)
was a presidential candidate who was extremely concerned for
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this one woman who was worried about the economy.

Viewers

could easily infer, from seeing Clinton's concern for this

woman, that he would carry this understanding of the economy
and concern for its victims into the White House and turn

things around.
This sort of concern for a troubled fellow human being

carries such strong emotional weight, that it could also
dispel any uncertainties voters might have about Clinton's
alleged immorality (the Flowers' affair), unpatriotic

attitude (dodging the draft and alleged participation in
anti-American demonstrations in Russia), or character
problems (there was certainly no waffling in his feelings of

concerh for this woman),

in this particular instance, body

language (walking toward the woman, establishing eye

contact, talking directly to her) and the display of concern
overrode the content of Clinton^s answer.

It is clear that Clinton's strongest attribute in this
debate was his demonstration of concern for "ordinary
people."

clearly, this sort of empathy with the problems of

voters would increase his likability factor.

But Clinton

also had to prove to voters that he was competent to lead
the country.

To do this he would have to overcome possible

concerns that he was too young and inexperienced and show
that he understood the national and international concerns

of the U.S.

Three characteristics of Clinton's speech style
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aritJ choice of words would bolster voters' confidence in his

abilities:

numbering, leadership statements, profusion of

the first person pronoun "I."

Numbering has long been used by speakers to hold an

audience's attention and provide a comforting sense of
completion to the speaker's statement.

Max Atkinson adds

that such numbering, "...can work to strengthen, underline
or amplify almost any kind of message" (60).

It is not

surprising, therefore, that out of the twelve answers

Clinton provided during the second debate, half of them

(six) included numbering and, of those six, four of the
answers contained three numbered items, which is the most

potent and satisfying form of numbering for the listener.
The other two answers contained two and four numbered items.

Neither Bush nor Perot included numbering in their
answers during the second debate, prefering a more informal

method for proposing solutions to problems.

This tactic

benefitted Perot because it furthered his "folksy" image.
Numbering would have made him appear more prepared than

"just a businessman" should be.

Bush, as the incumbent,

strengthened his leadership image by confidently explaining

problems and calling upon his experience in office as proof
of his understanding of the situations presented.

If Bush

had used numbering, it could have worked against him, making
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it appear as though he were coming up with new solutions to
problems he should already have solved.
Clinton's numbering, however, in contrast to the
relaxed attitude of the other two candidates, made him

appear knowledgeable on the issues and ready to put a

specific plan in place once he were in Washington in order
to make the lives of all American citizens far better.

Further, Clinton's numbering of steps in planned solutions,
in contrast to Bush's listing of what had already occurred,
gave viewers the impression that, whatever Bush had done, it
hadn't worked and some new plan must be put into effect.
Television viewers had the added visual benefit (over

radio listeners) of seeing Clinton number each proposed step
with his fingers.

The movement of Clinton's hand in unison

with his words further strengthened each numbered statement
that he made.

An additional factor in Clinton's phrasing which

strengthened his imaga as a capable leader was his profusion
of leadership statements,

Bennet notes that "appeals to

popular leadership images are an important part of the
pragmatics of any campaign."

He explains the importance of

leadership statements when he writes

If elections are about nothing else, they
entail the dramatization and resolution of

collective concerns about security, governmental
succession, and the shape of the future. In order

for candidates to play their roles properly, they
must address these concerns by symbolizing
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leadership as the basic campaign issue and by
transmitting familiar images of leadership in the
process (226).

in other words, voters who are about to experience a change
of leadership want to be reassured that they are secure in
the hope that their lifestyle will remain relatively intact
if not improved by the candidate they elect.

Thus, it is

the candidate's primary concern to consistently reassure
voters in the form of leadership statements.

If a candidate

is able to project an image of strong leadership, then
vdters

that this leader will not waiver in

times of crisis.

Clinton strengthened his leadership image for the
voters in two ways.

First, he made continual reference to

his position and experience as Governor of Arkansas for
twelve years and, in so doing, reminded voters that he had

been a leader for many years.

This is in keeping with

Bennet's theory that projecting leadership imagery to voters
gains support for a candidate:

A common pragmatic symbolization of leadership
is the practice of incumbents to blur the

distinction between their image as a candidate and
their image as public official.... Candidates who

lack this symbolic resource (incumbency) must
develop other devices if they are to convert their
obligatory attention to leadership into a
pragmatic consideration as well.

...short of

being president, the next best strategy for a
candidate is to create situations in which he can
appear to act in a presidential manner (228-229).

Clinton began this leadership association for the

audience in his first response during the debate, indicating
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that his desire to promote his governing experience was

foremost in importance for him.

in fact, Clinton's self-

promotion was so prominent in his agenda, it seems, that the

leadership statement was interjected somewhat out of
into the response, resulting in an illogical presentation of
his thoughts.
Clinton's first words in the debate were:

"I'd like to

answer the question, because I've actually been a governor
for twelve years, so I've known a lot of people who have
lost their jobs because of jobs moving overseas, and I know
a lot of people whose plants have been strengthened by

increasing exports" (Renter 16:15).
Upon hearing this response, the audience might have

initially assumed that Clinton was saying he'd like to

answer the question because he'd "actually been a governor
for twelve years," rather than what he really meant to
imply, which was that because he'd been a governor for
twelve years, he'd gleaned some experience relevant to
answering the question.

The word "actually" in Clinton's

response reveals an embarrassingly puerile attempt at self-

promotion.

The use of this word worked against him because

it sounds childish, and it displayed a subconscious reactive
defense against the opinion of voters who believed him too
young and inexperienced to be president, thus validating
those opinions.
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After this awkward start, Clinton referred to his

governorship five more times during the debate, including
his closing statement.

his responses, were:

These references, included within

"I've worked on these things for

twelve years...." (Renter 16:17); "I've been governor of a

small state for twelve years,...." (Renter 16:30); "...I've
spent more of my time and life on this in the last twelve

years than any other issue" (Renter 16:33); "...the people
of my state have let me be their governor for twelve years
because..." (Renter 16:35); "...my state ranks first in the
country in job growth,..." (Renter 16:35).

Along with these references to his governorship,

Clinton attempted to strengthen his leadership image with a

profusibn of the first-person singular pronoun "I" scattered
throughout his speech.

When viewed in comparison to the

speech of the other two candidates in the debate, the

abundance of Clinton's "I" statements is noteworthy.
Although "I" statements did appear in Bush's and Perot's
speech. Bush's responses included more statements of fact

("There are...

"This is...") which reflected his knowledge

of specific issues, yet removed him personally from his
statements.

Perot's responses utilized the second-person

(''You've got to...") as he outlined what must be done to fix

pfoblems in the government, although it could be assumed by

the audience that Perot himself would be the active ageht in
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active agent in his proposed solutions.

The use of the

second person sounds less harsh and more informal than

consistently saying, "I am going to..." throughout the
debate.

Brennan and Hahn state:

"That the frequency of the

first-person singular [pronoun] is related to egocentrism is

neither a new nor discerning notion,..." {51). certainly,
the constant use of "I" draws attention to the speaker.

This is exactly what Clinton hoped for. His responses are
filled with combinations of "i think," "i believe," "i
want," "I asked," "I suggested," "I found," "I saw."

Yet,

rather than assume the more superficial motivation of

egocentrism behind this sort of word choice, it might be
suggested that Clinton is using the "i" pronoun in his

speech to indicate his personal ownership of and investment

in his statements, thus promoting his leadership
capabilities.

When Clinton says, "i think," or "i believe," it
appears that he wants to make it clear to the audience that

these opinions are his own, carefully examined and arrived
at after much study, rather than facts he obtained from an

analyst or almanac. When he employs such statements as, "I
asked," "i suggested," "i found," he is indicating to the

audience that he personally took action to solve the problem
under discussion.
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Brennan and Hahn offer another explanation for a
speaker's use of "I think," when they write: "As the subject
becomes more aware of personal fallibility, direct

statements are replaced by more cautious indirections, such
as 'it seems that,' 'it may be,' and 'I think that,' with
each expression followed by a noun clause.

In their

extreme, these indirections become vacillations" (51).

Yet,

this does not seem to be the case with Clinton's speech.

As

stated above, he is attempting to show the voters his

personal investment in his facts and opinions.

The

alternative phrasing would have been "I know," which is far
tbo strong, sounding somewhat overbearing and not commonly
used in this situation, or direct statements of fact, such
as Bush used, which would not indicate a personal investment
in the ensuing phrase.
All of the factors explored above:

Use of the "I"

pronoun, references to governorship, people first, and
distancing from Washington, came together in one particular
response Clinton gave during the debate, when he defended
himself against Perot's innuendo that Bush and Clinton let

others do their thinking for them.

Perot stated: "Now, just

for the record, I don't have any spin doctors.

I don't have

any speechwriters.

Probably shows.

see on television.

But you don't have to wonder if it's me

talking.

I make those charts you

See, what you see is what you get, and if you
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don't like it, you got two other choices, right?" (Reuter
16:17)

Clinton interrupted Perot's response, saying
Wait a minute. I want to say just one thing
now, Ross, in fairness. The ideas I express are
mine. I've worked on these things for twelve
years and I'm the only person up here who hasn't
been part of Washington in any way for the last
twenty years. So I don't want the implication to
be that somehow everything we say is just cooked
up and put in our head by somebody else. I worked
twelve years very hard as a governor on the real
problems of real people. I'm just as sick as you
are by having to wake up and figure out how to
defend myself every day. I never thought I'd ever
be involved in anything like this (Reuter 16:17).
In this statement, Clinton reveals how important it is to

him to have voters know how hard he has worked on coming to
his own conclusions about various issues.

His personal

investment in the process, indicated by the "I" pronoun, is
abundantly obvious.

He distances himself from Washington,

thus villainizing Perot and Bush in the audience's mind.

He

makes two distinct references to his experience as governor,
using the magic number "twelve."

And he talks about "real"

problems and "real" people, again villainizing Bush and
Perot by suggesting that they have spent too much time "at

the top" to have any experience with actual human beings and

must have arrived at their opinions some other way.
This sort of defensive response by a non-incumbent is
usually directed at incumbents.

But Bush and Clinton had

been admonished earlier by two questioners to quit "mud
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slinging" and just stick to solving the issues.

So Clinton

interjected his image-promoting defense at the most
appropriate time.

If he had interrupted Bush with this sort

of utterance, he might have invited a stronger response from
Bush than Perot's simple, "May I finish?" and been viewed as

ignoring the requests of the "real" people to stop such
bickering.

Additionally, Clinton's use of Perot's first name,
"Ross," created a friendly and informal tone, because

friends call each other by first name.

This friendly

informality is in stark contrast to the very formal tone of
the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debate in which Nixon referred to his

opponent as "Senator Kennedy," and Kennedy responded with
"Mr. Nixon" or "the vice president."
Clinton faced a dichotomy in his efforts to distance

himself from Washington and big government while, at the
same time, proving that his experience as Arkansas' governor

qualified him to run the country.
easily resolv^^

This predicament was

however, by not including both

qualifications in the same statement and by responding with
the appropriate aspect depending upon the question.

When an

audience member posed a question calling for a propbSed
solution to a specific problem, Clinton would inflate his

experience as governor to cover such issues as national

health care and a balanced economy.
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But when the questioner

exhibited some vulnerability or asked for the candidate's
personal experience, such as the ydung black woman mentioned

above, Clinton reduced his governpiship of Arkahsae
equivalent of running a town meeting.
He began his response to her b

"Tell me how

it's affected you again. You know peopie who've lost their
jobs and lost their homes?"

She responded affirmatively and

then Clinton attempted to align himself with the woman's
experience, saying, "Well, I'ye been governor Of a small
state for twelve years.

I'11 tell you how it's affected me.

Every year congress and the president sign laws that make us
do more things and gives us less money to do it with"
(Reuter 16:30). Then he continued to relate to the woman

what the federal government had done to the people of his
state.

Clinton^s use of the word "small" in tbe response hp
the woman is significant.

It distanced him from Washington

and identified him With all the other "small" citizens who
were, supposedly, too insignificant to be of concern to the

federal government.

His use of the third-person plural "us"

also forged this alliance between Clinton and those who had

suffered at the hands of the federal government.

By limiting or expanding his governing experience,
depehding upon what type of reisponso wa^^ required, and by
focusing upon only one aspect of that experience per each
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response, Clinton was able to accomplish the difficult

rhetorical feat of projecting both images to the debate
audience;

his domain was small enough that he could

experience each person's pain personally, yet large enough
to provide him with the expertise to govern a nation.

In addition to Clinton's word choices, another

important element to be examined in this debate was his
propensity to wait rather than volunteer to answer a

question.

Out of the twelve questions asked, Clinton only

volunteered to answer once, and even with this one instance,
he was not volunteering to respond first, but to answer

second.

Clinton gave the first response only three times,

only because the question was directed at him.

Of the three

times he responded second, he was directed to answer by the
moderator twice.

Clinton was the last to respond six times.

Perot, like Clinton, responded first three times, second

three times, and last six times, yet he volunteered three

times.

Most significantly. Bush aggressively volunteered to

respond five times and never responded last.
first six times and second six times.

He responded

The moderator, Carole

Simpson, did not seem to employ any order in her direction

of questions to the candidates.

In fact, once when she

called on Clinton to answer second, he declined, saying,
"Ross has his hand up" (Reuter 16:17).
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This information can be interpreted two ways.

If a

viewer had perceived Clinton as a waffler before the debate,
his lack of volunteering might justify such an opinion.

It

might be assumed that he needed time to think over a proper
response and wanted to hear what the other two candidates

had to say first.

Perhaps he knew he could come up with a

more palatable response after judging the responses of Bush
and Perot and capitalizing on their errors or inadequacies.
If a viewer were pro-Clinton, the candidate's
responding last could be viewed as a sign of patience and

deference to others.

The Clinton supporter might believe

that Clinton was allowing the other two candidates to go

first because he was being polite, rather than buying time
to come up with an answer.

The assumption could also be

made that Clinton was shrewd enough to realize the
rhetorical advantage to speaking last.
Certainly, it was to Clinton's advantage to answer
last.

After having a chance to hear the responses of the

other two candidates and having more time to form his

response, Clinton would be at an advantage.

Also, the last

response to a question would probably be the one most likely

to be remembered by the audience, further strengthening
Clinton's position.
Clinton successfully promoted himself in the second

televised presidential debate of 1992 by continually
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reminding the voters of his leadership position (as Governor

of Arkansas), distancing himself from Washington, appearing
sympathetic to questioners, and including strong, factual
statements in his responses.

Thirty-two years previously, John F. Kennedy certainly
realized in advance what opportunities a nationally

televised presidential debate would provide him.

However,

what Kennedy considered to be an opportunity in a television
appearance, namely the further projection and strengthening

of his image before millions of voters, was probably
different from Nixon's idea of opportunity.

Before the

first debate, Nixon only seemed eager for the opportunity to
present his ideas to the voters, not his image.
Kennedy's success in the debates would be threefold:

he would receive national recognition and become as wellknown as vice President Nixon; he would overcome the voters'

negative perception of him as too young and inexperienced as
he proved his knowledge of the issues; and, with his
knowledge of how to manipulate the technicalities of visual

effects during the debates, he would project a stronger,
more likeable image than Nixon.

Minow and Sloan confirm

Kennedy's understanding of the television medium and its

advantages for him whey they write: "Senator Kennedy was
comfortable with television and confident that he could use
it to his advantage" (10).
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Certainly, Kennedy achieved nation-wide recognitidn
with these televised debates and convinced many more voters '

that he was capable of serving asl President ^

Berry writes

...Kennedy, the lesser known candidate, gained

prominence by receiving prime time TV cpverage
with vice Presideht Richard Nixohv ...th^ general

consensus of opinion was that KehnedYpvercame the
publicVs perceived image of him as too immature
and too inexperienced to lead the free world" (34
35).
Berry explains that Kennedy accomplished this image reversal
"by demonstrating his broad awareness of all the issues and

by quickly citing pertinent facts and statistics to support

his statements" (35).

Kennedy also established his

authority by challenging Nixon's many statements about the

Republican record and countering with his own proposals.
Yet, even though Kennedy and Nixon countered each
others proposals for a better nation, the candidates'
appearance had a greater effect upon viewers than did their
words.

It was the first major triumph of image over issues

in the television medium.

Reeves' analysis of the debate

summarizes the effect it had upon viewers
Despite their lack of intellectual substance, the
debates stirred public interest in the election
and clearly helped Kennedy's campaign.... Jack
became better known to the nation and impressed
millions with his ability to stand toe--to-toe with

the more famous viGe-president.
^

gharisma-^

His emerg^^

from a blend of good looks, a

forceful speaking manner, and a seeming abundance

bf sblf-confidence, charm, and sihcerity--was no
doubt an even more powerful influence" (200-201).
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Clearly, the words that were spoken in that first debate

were not as powerful as the positive, confident image of
Kennedy that was transmitted to millions of television
viewers that night.

Kennedy had already glossed over his very serious

health problems through his denial of them and by exuding an
aura of vitality in all of his photographs and appearances.
He had also successfully minimized the negative effects of

his Catholic religion in his "Houston Ministers' Speech."
Therefore, the principle negative factor that he would be

attempting to change in the debates was the charge that he
was too young and inexperienced to govern the country.

During the four "Great Debates" between Kennedy and
Nixon, it became obvious that the two candidates had no

disparate views on the goals for America, only on the means
to achieve those goals.

With disagreement thus minimized,

the debates were reduced to a battle of images.

Nowhere was

this more apparent than in the first debate on September 26,
1960 in Chicago.

It is estimated that seventy-five million

people watched the two candidates on television that night,
and many based their opinion of the candidates upon what

they saw, not what they heard.

As testimony to television's

visual power, those who watched the first debate on

television thought Kennedy was the winner; those who
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listened to the debate on radio thought Nixon was the
winner.

The reason television viewers gave the debate to

Kennedy has been well documented and is encapsulated by
Jamieson in Presidential Debates

In the first presidential debate of 1960,
Nixon--pale from a hospital stay and perspiring
under the hot studio lights—evinced cues that

can, but do not necessarily, signal stress. By
giving him a sinister look, the beard apparent
under his poorly made-up translucent skin

complicated matters further. Nixon glanced
repeatedly at a clock just off stage. In a
bearded, pale, perspiring candidate, this invited

the inappropriate inference that Nixon was shiftyeyed.

Additionally, the freshly painted set had

dried to a color lighter than that anticipated by
Nixon's consultants. Consequently the gray suit
he wore blended into the background, blurring his
image. Finally, an injury to his knee as he
alighted his limousing caused him pain.

By shifting weight from that knee to the podium he
minimized the pain, but at high cost. During his
hospital stay, he had lost weight. His suit, as a
result, was a bit large for him. As he leaned on
the podium for support, the suit shifted forward

on one shoulder, suggesting that he had, perhaps,
purchased it second hand or borrowed it from a

friend.

In a fitted blue suit, his face

suntanned, Kennedy looked more decisive than his

pale, ill-suited eye-shifting opponent.... Dogged
by the charge that he was too inexperienced to
lead the nation, Kennedy looked resolute. At one
point he caught a glimpse of himself on the studio
monitor and reacted by assuming a determined
expression. As Nixon spoke, Kennedy took notes as
if in anticipation of rebuttal. To minimize his

youthful look, Kennedy trimmed his bushy hair"
(183-184).

In the 1992 televised presidential debates, the visual
contrast between candidates was not as stark as this first
debate between Kennedy and Nixon because all three
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candidates, armed with the knowledge gained from past

televised debates, realized that image was of first
importance.

It might be said that Nixon had no such

knowledge in this first debate and was caught completely
unaware of the power of television's projection of images to
the viewers.

In combination with Kennedy's vigorous appearance in
comparison to Nixon's sweaty, shifty, dour one, Kennedy's
rhetorical style supported the image of a candidate
energetic, determined, and knowledgeable enough to lead the

nation.

Barber quotes James McGregor Burns as saying of

Kennedy during his campaign, "He slowly developed a style of
direct, informal, simple speaking, without high-blown
rhetoric or bombastic exaggeration, that to some of his
listeners was in happy contrast to the oratory of the oldfashioned politicians" (357).

During the first debate, Kennedy's rhetorical style
played out in several ways.

The significance of some

elements of Kennedy's rhetoric were highlighted by Nixon's
ineptness in understanding the television medium.

For

instance, Nixon entered the first debate believing that it

would be, in fact, a debate.

But, as Rubin points out,

"...the word 'debate' was stretched that night on several
counts.

As debaters, the candidates would have done better

alone" (55).
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Jamieson explains what happened that night and why
Nixon's misunderstanding of television's style put Kennedy
in the forefront:

By viewing it as a 'debate,' Nixon 'lost' the
first Kennedy-Nixon joint appearance. His varsity
debate instincts at the ready, the vice president
marshalled his facts against Kennedy's, contested
points, and defended his ground. He instead
should have showcased himself against the backdrop
Kennedy provided. By combatting Kennedy's
arguments, Nixon legitimized the less experienced
senator and ignored an opportunity to appear
presidential (Eloquence. 50).
Atkinson asserts that television calls for a different

style of projection.

He writes:

"...to rely on techniques

of oratory in a studio interview of discussion is to run the

risk of coming across as long-winded, tense and generally
lacking in spontaneity" ((176).

These adjectives were

ascribed to Nixon's style in the first debate, lending
further credibility to the fact that Nixonhad a limited
understanding of how to best conduct himself on television
to receive a positive viewer reaction.
The inherent problems of televised debates—choices to

be made and the implications of those choices—are also

explained by Jamieson when she writes about the pressures
placed upon the candidates

They are expected, for example, to both engage
each other and speak to the mass audience.

As

every presidential debate has demonstrated, it is

difficult to do both. Nixon chose to engage
Kennedy in their first debate, repeatedly
summarizing Kennedy's points and addressing his
arguments.

In the process, he lost the
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opportunities Kennedy seized to play to the folks
at home. By so doing, the vice president won as a
debater and lost as would-be president
(Presidential Debates. 165).
"Play to the folks at home," is exactly what Kennedy
excelled at in this first debate.

While Nixon dutifully

combatted Kennedy's statements point-by-point, Kennedy,

according to White, "used each question as a springboard for
an appeal to the mind and the imagination of the audience
assembled before the countless sets" (288).

Nixon also made the mistake of continually referring to

Kennedy by name during the debate.

"Senator Kennedy" was so

prevalent in Nixon's responses that the audience was

continually reminded of him, even when he wasn't speaking.
Conversely, Kennedy mentioned his opponent only when
necessary in his responses and then referred to him only as
"Mr. Nixon" or "the vice president"—never "Vice President

Nixon."

In this way, Kennedy diminished the image of Nixon

as vice president and kept him in the background as much as
possible when giving his responses.

By the end of the

evening, it might be assumed by some voters that Kennedy was

leading the way with his own innovative and effective plan
for getting America moving again while Nixon's policies were

formed by pointing out what was wrong with Kennedy's plan.
Kennedy also effectively spelled out the similarities

in his and Nixon's governmental experience, thus favorably
cancelling any remaining concerns in voters' minds that he
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was; not experlerieed enough to lead the country,

In fact,

the first question posed to Kehnedy in the debate concerned

Nixon's charges that he was^ f^^

"immature."

Kennedy

responded that both he and"the vice president" came to

Congress in 1946i"i've been there now for fourteen years,"
said Kennedy, ''the same period of time that he has, so that
our experience in government' is comparable" (New York Times
28}.

\

Kehnedy found an opportunity 1ater in the debate to
again equate his eJ^perience with that of Nixon's while

subtly drawing comparisons between himself and Abraham
Lincoln in the vot^^

minds.

He said, "Abraham Lincoln

came to the pre^^^

in 1860 after a rather little known

Session in the House of Representatives and after being

defeated for the Senate in '58 and was a distinguished
president"

(New York Times 28>,

He then told voters that

there is no certain road to the presidency and again
reminded them that he had been in Congress for fourteen
'^years.. • v

Kennedy's opening and cldsing statements and responses
to questions conveyed a more visionary and inspiring message

than Nixpn'S business-like review of the facts and what

should be done.

Charles H. Percy, chairman of the

Republican Platform Committee, Said that ''Mr. Nixon had

'countered with facts' while Senator Kennedy 'spoke of the
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future' " (New York Times 29

However, Percy's derision of

Kennedy's fprward-looking rhetoric showed no Understanding
of the positive impact of this type of speech on the voters.
Kennedy was calling the nation together as an

invincible freedom force against the tyranny of Communism
which was threatening the world.

fails

"If the United States

he pronounced in his opening statement, "then the

whole cause of freedom fails.

And I think it depends in

great measure on what we do here in this country" (New York
Times 28).

Kennedy then focused this evil threat of Gommunism in

Khrushchev/ thus providing Americans with a real person, a
villain, to be on guard against.

Kennedy stated:

We discuss tonight domestic issues, but i would
not want that to be any implication to be given
that this does not involve directly our struggle
with Mr. Khrushchev for survival. Mr. Khrushchev
is in New York and he maintains the Gommunist

offensive throughout the world because of the
productive power of the soviet union itself (New
York Times 28).

Because Kennedy could tell viewers that Khrushchev was

in New York, on their own native soil, it heightened the

importance and urgency of the issue of warding off this

impending threat.

He was also able, through this tactic,

to keep his campaign theme--making America strong to fight
off the impending threat of Gommunism--in a debate which was
to be focused solely upon domestic issues.

Jamieson

illustrates the importance of public figures' use of
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villains and heroes when she writes;

"At any moment in the

life of a republic, the public can viscerally distinguish

those presumed to be villainous from those presumed to be
virtuous.

Of svich assumptions of virtue and villainy

political discourse is made.

Countering them is difficult-

capitalizing on them simple" (Dirtv Politics. 44).
Kennedy capitalized on heroes by invoking popular U.S.
presidents in his speech, thus forming an identification in
the voters' minds between himself and these presidents'
successful policies.

Abraham Lincoln appeared in the first

sentence of Kennedy's opening statement.

Franklin Roosevelt

and his policies appeared twice in the opening statement.
In Kennedy's first response, he stated:

"I come out of

the Democratic party, which in this century has produced
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman and
which supported and sustained these programs which I've

discussed tonight" (New York Times 28). In this statement,
Kennedy is blatantly identifying himself with these

presidents as if to say, "I am like them.

They were

successful; I will be just as successful.

If you agreed

with their administration, you should vote for me."
Kennedy continued to invoke past presidents in his
responses to questions.

"Mr. Truman" and Abraham Lincoln

appeared in his third response and Franklin Roosevelt

appeared once more in the last response of the evening.
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Nixon, in contrast, only once called upon the name of other
presidents when he compared the records of Truman and
Eisenhower.

Besides his use of heroes and villains, Kennedy

employed two rhetorical devices in his speech which Atkinson
attri-butes to m

charismatic speakers:

three and contrastive pairs.

lists of

Both of these appear in

Kennedy's prepared opening statement.

Atkinson describes a cpntrastiyepai^ as an antithesis
in which "a common and highly effective technique for

attracting attentioh (i.e. a puzzle) is used as a
preliminary to supplying a clever pUiich^^^^ l

solution).

Kennedy begins his opening statement in the first debate

with a contrasting pair involving "the election of 1860" and
"the election of 1960"

In the election of 1860, Abraham Lincoln said the

question was Whether this natiohspuld exist halfslave or half-free.

In the election Of I960, and with the World
around us, tiie question is whet^
will
exist half-slave or half-free; whether it will
move in the direction of freedom, in the direction
of the road that we are taking, or whether it will
move in the direction of slaverv (New York Times

•: ■ ; ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ :::4-r;?8.) .■
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The "puzzle" Kennedy presents his audience in the first

sentence is the question of whether, in 1860, the nation
could exist half-slave/half-free.

The "punch line" to this

puzzle is a new, but similar question:

whether, in 1960,

the world will exist haif-slave/half-free.
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In this

contrastive pair, the first sentence describes a nation

considering its present status (whether it could continue to
exist half-slave/half-free).

The second sentence describes

the entire world considering its future (whether it will
exist half-slave/half-free).

The basis for the contrast is

a convenient 100 years (1860 to 1960) and the importance of
two elections,

A second contrastive pair that Kennedy used in his

opening statement also relied upon comparisons between past
and present
In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt said in his

inaugural that this generation of Americans has a
rendezvous with destiny.
I think our generation of Americans has the
same rendezvous with destiny (New York Times 28).

Again, a time contrast appears, reminding voters of
important decisions of the past that impinged upon present
circumstances.

It is noteworthy, as well, that in the first

sentence of both of the above contrastive pairs, Kennedy
invokes a successful president of the past.

In the second

sentence of each contrastive pair, as Kennedy describes the
current state of affairs, the implication is that the

solution to the situation or the accomplishment of the task

can only be performed by him, since he is identifying the
problem and pointing the direction to take.
Atkinson explains the rhetorical benefit of contrastive

pairs when he states:
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Contrasts work in such a way as to have
considerable advantages both for projecting a
completion point and for delivering a punch line
that is likely to appeal to an audience in a way
that is similar to that of the punch line of a
good joke. If the speaker can present his
audience with some sort of puzzle, he stands a
good chance of arousing their curiosity, and thus
giving them more of an incentive to pay attention.
They will then be in a good position tp recognize
and appreciate whatever soltition is provided by
the punch line. (73)
Lists of three, as described by Atkinson, can be either
the same word repeated three times, such as in "We shall

fight, fight, fight," or the same word used at the beginning
of each phrase in a list of three.

The rhetorical advantage

to this three-fold repetition is that it provides speakers
"with a way of underlining or giving progressively more
emphasis to the point being made, and doing so in such a way
as to give the impression that all possibilities have been
covered and there is nothing else to be said on the matter"
(Atkinson 159, 160).

Kennedy employs lists of three in three consecutive

paragraphs at the beginning of his opening statement, which
creates a rhythmic momentum in his speech similar to that
created by cheers at a sports event.

three, Kennedy repeats "the kind of";

In the first list of

"The kind of country

we have here, the kind of society we have, the kind of
strength we build in the United States will be the defense

of freedom."

Not only does Kennedy enliven his speech with

this device, but he also chooses to focus upon the visionary
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topic of what type of country, society and strength
Americans h^^^

that his knowledge of the

issues that affect Anierica are informed by an overall vision
of this country.

ken

follows this statement with anQther

list of three (although the faulty parallel grammatical
structure in the third phrase diminishes the effect

somewhat).

He says, "If we do well here. if we meet our

obligations, if we're moving ahead, then I think freedom
will be secure around the world."

In the next paragraph, Kennedy repeats the phrase "are

we" three times:

"Are we doing as much as we can do, are we

as strong as we should be, are we as strong as we must be."

In this statement, as well as the previous list of three in
which 'fwe" is focused upon, Kennedy includes himself with

his listeners as he implies that personal action is required
to ensure that America's strength is sufficient to promote
world-wide freedom.

Interestingly, whenever Nixon used "we"

during this first debate, it was in reference to either him

and Kennedy or as an inclusive reference to the Republican
Party, never as an inclusive reference to Nixon and other
Americans.

The contrastive pairs and lists of three added a

dynamic, "visionary, poetic sense to Kennedy^s speech; that

made Nixon's predictable repetition of facts and proposals
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seeiti dull iii comparison.

iBerry lends credence to the power

of Kennedy's use of memorable phrases rhthe^^

a reliance

upon quoting facts when he writes, "When Kennedy proclaimed

that the time was ripe 'to get this country moving again,'

he was referring principally to improving the national

economy and to closing the alleged missile gap.

But these

goals implied larger matters of national character,

strength, and prestige" (54).
Barber describes the success of the Kennedy style in

the following statement
...Kennedy'S personal cool, his critical stance

toward self'-satisfaction, his call for a higher
standard of performance, and his thirst for

action--or some part of symbiosis of those--fit
the mood of the young, and, increasingly in a
culture where the young are thought to show the
way, the not so young. After the television

debates with Nixon, Kennedy was remembered not so
much for what he said as for the impression of

expertise, precision, and jud^ent he Cbnveyed"
(360).

Kennedy had successfully used the debates as he had intended

to:

to prpve his experience and competence as a leader and

project a winning image to the American public.
When Kennedy used the I960 televised presidential

debates to promote his^ image to the American voters, he
showed tlie?way for future presidential candidates who would
use this same method of winning over voters-

The first

Kennedy-Nixon debate clearly established for future

candidates the importance of image over issues, visuals over
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speech.

Thirty-two years of repetition of this type of

performance informed the candidates in the 1992 televised

presidential debates that how they appeared held greater

weight with voters than what they said.

Yet, although the

importance of image over issues remained constant, styles of
presentation had changed.

As will be shown in the next chapter, informality and
brevity of response signal the changes that have occurred in
the evolution of televised presidential debates.

The reason

for the appearance of these qualities can be traced back to
the importance of image over issues.
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Conclusion

Both Kennedy and Clinton created an image to meet voter

expectations by accentuating their positives and minimizing
their negatives, yet their attempt to project and maintain
that image through the televised presidential debates was

affected by both the emerging technology of television and
evplving voter expectations of how a candidate should act.
Kennedy's invitation to the press to view scenes from his

private life (albeit staged^

a floodgate of

media scrutiny which has plagued candidates and informed

voters eyer sihce.^

Government scandals/ such as Watergate,

and ineptness, such as the Vietnam War, created distrust in

the public.

At the same time, the emerging prominence of

teievision created an exi?ectati6h in viewers of receiving
information iinmedi^tely arid in compact segments, such as the
60 second ads they had become so accustomed to.

Both the

voters' increasing familiarity with television and their

increasing disillusionment with political candidates and
government, shaped their expectations of how candidates

should act in a televised presidential debate,
In comparing the rhetorical styles of two televised

presidential debates, thirty years apart, it must be

determined what changes have occurred and why.

Although as

thproughsarialysla of rhetorical evolution would require
compiling data from all televised presidential debates/ the

tvito debates examined iri this

do contain major elements

84

that are representative of the progressioh of rhetorical
style over the past thirty years.
The most notable differences in the current debate

style when cpmpared to thie 1960 debate are:

(1) informality

(as seen in a more conversatipnal style and personal

statement;s); and (2) breyity pf response and statements.

It

is, perhaps, the voters' expectation of being allowed into

the private lives of candidates in order to judge their
mental and ethical traits that brought about a more informal
atmosphere to televised presidential debates.

The second

factor, brevity, most certainly came about d^e to the
technology of television, which created the expectation in

viewers of short segments of information.

Although the format of the 1992 debate allowed a

greater amount of informality than most contemporary
debates/ it is feflectlye of the expectations of the voters
who, althpugh interested in candidate positions on important
issues, hope to find instances during televised presidential

debates from which they can judge what they assume to be the
character of the candidates.

This can best be done when

there is a greater amount of exchange between the candidates
than when, as in 1960 and other earlier debates, the strict
format of the debate minimized spontaneous exchanges between
candidates.
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Alan Harrington real

that, even in the 1960 debate,

voters were using the event to assess the governing
capabilities of the candidates when he desbribed it as
first great, nationwide personnel interview in history"

(Political Television. 60),

Voters who read the transcript

of the debate in the paper the next day or who listened to
the debate on radio, could not benefit from tbe full

;

spectrum of factors afforded them by viewing the event on
television, such as Nixon's pasty, sweating face and

Kennedy's confident eye contact.

Kennedy's planned

presentation of a positive image and Nixon's unplanned

■i

presentation of a negative one were lost on that portion of
the debate audience which either listened to the event on

radio or read about it in the newspaper.
Jamieson chronicles the reasons for voters increasingly

using the debates to judge what they perceive to be the
candidates'

character when she writes

One powerful factor propelling candidates,

press, and the public toward press conferences and
debates is the disillusionment that followed the
revelations of Vietnam and Watergate.

Voters

sought additional sourGes of evidence about those
who would lead.

The 'character? of the candidate

become more salient.

The conftohtatlonS debates
create seemed one way to test the character of the
candidates

(Presidential Debates. 109) .

Once voters became aware that the president could make
mistakes as well as be dishonest, they began to give the
presidential candidate's ethical and mental traits
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prominence over the candidate's position on important
issues.

It was known by voters that issues could be

forgotten or changed once an elected president took office,

but a person's basic nature could not so easily be changed.
Thus, voters began to depend upon the televised presidential

debates as an important forum for discovering or confirming
their opinions about candidates.
Confrontation in both the 1960 and 1992 televised

debates could be described more as an encounter or an

exchange of ideas than an aggressive action.

The most

common form of confrontation seen in these debates is an

interruption for the purpose of correcting another speaker.
By keeping aggression at a minimum, candidates are able to
promote an image of themselves as fair and kind, thus

increasing their likability factor. In the first 1960
presidential debate, there was only one interruption of a
speaker.

This occurred when Kennedy interrupted a

questioner three times in succession to correct his
misinterpretation of Kennedy's past statements.

Although Kennedy and Nixon sometimes responded to
statements made by each other, these responses were always

done within their properly allotted turn for answering a
question.

Thus, the voters were able to judge these

candidates by the way they looked, the way they talked, what
they said, and hOW they responded to pressure, i.e., a live
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televised debate, seen by millions of voters.

Yet/ the

voters could not judge the candidates by how they responded
to their opponent.

The only interaction Kennedy and Nixon

engaged in during this debate was looking at bach other,

perhaps because addressing each other directly during the :

debate would haVe appeared out of line and thus/in 196
extremely confrontational.

In contrast, the second 1992 presidential debate

contained several interruptions of candidates by each other
and "off-the-cuff" comments, creating a conversational tone.

For instance, when Clinton was responding to a questioner
who asked if the candidates could stop "trashing" each
other. Bush took exception to one of his statements and

interrupted, saying, "Please don't get into the Washington

Post."

Clinton, momentarily caught off guard, responded to

Bush, saying, "You don't have to believe it."

This brief

exchange between the two candidates allowed voters to make a

deeper assessment of their communication styles than they
received in 1960 when candidates

simply responded to

questions with well-rehearsed position statements.

This

type of assessment would allow voters to make the logical
assumption that how a candidate deals with the stressful

interruptions during a national televised debate might
reflect how a candidate deals with stressful communication
as president.
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Interestingly, Bush's comment, abovfr^^

either a positiye or hegative for hiin •

be seen as

It could prove that

Bush was, indeed, fed up with incorrect statements from the

press, which would align him positively with many voters who
felt the same way.

Also, his comment could be seen as sign

of strength because he was not afraid to make what might be
an unpopular comment in order to keep the debate moving

along factual lines.

Negatively, Bush's comment could prove

that he was a "whiner" and that he could interrupt at
inappropriate times.

Clinton's response to^^ ^^B

since he was in a defensive

position under Bush's "attack," could only be seen in a

positive light because he was not the aggressor in this
confrontation and gave a conciliatory statement in response.
There are several more instances in this debate in

which the candidates either have a short back-and-forth

exchange with each other or with the moderator.

The

frequency of this type of encounter creates for the viewer a

more informal, conversational "debate" or "roundtable"
discussion than the more constrained styles of past
televised presidential debates and, thus, allows voters more

factors with which toi judge the candidate.

For instance,

these unplanned exchanges preseht instances to the

candidates which they jmay not have planned for before the
debate, thus increasing the amount of spontaneous responses
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each candidate must provideV

These exchange^^^

provide

feedback to the voters on how a candidate responds in

different situations—stressful or friendly—which might
also indicate how this candidate responds in similar

situations while in office when national security might be
at stake,

simply respondihg to questions, as Kennedy and

Nixoh did in 1960, only shows voters how the future
president might act in a press Conferencei
Brevity of response, the second factbrQ

mentioned above, also adds to the perceiVed informality of
contemporery debates since this supports the conversational
tone.

The reason for shrinking the time alloted for

candidate resppns^e^^^ can be iraced in the evolution of radio
and then television.

when radio first appeared in American

homes, hour-long speeches were the norm to be replaced by

half-hour speeches in the 1940s.

By the mid-50s, air time

costs ahd the dwindling attention of iisteners caused
politicans to reduce their air-time to five minutes.

This

was replaced in the 197OS by the sixty-second ad {Jamieson,
Eloquence 9-10)

■

Before radio and television, iAmericahs were not
accustomed to receiving information in short seigments.

All

they were offered were long speeches at political rallies
and verbose newspaper stories.

Even newspaper advertising,

before the prominence of television, carried lengthy
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messages rather than the mainly visual ads that are offered

today.

Television created a visual society; Americans

accustomed themselves to receiving messages through
pictures.

This visual method of gathering information was

quicker and more closely resembled the type of assessment

made about how someone looked (i.e., their image) rather
than what they said or included in their resume.

Jamieson provides reasons for why television has
changed political discourse when she writes
,..American audiences accustomed to the half-

hour sitcom are unlikely to sit for hours as
candidates detail their positions on television.
Long speeches are not only taxing, but expensive,
especially if more than two candidates join in
debate.

Solutions to the time crunch must take
account of the episodic character of television
programming and respond to the viewing habits of
the modern audience (Presidential Debates 195
196).

The main reason why television changed political discourse
was because Americans depended upon television mainly for

entertainment value, such as the sitcoms mentioned by
Jamieson or the popular game shows.

Americans did not

expect television to provide informative depth about
important issues.

In fact, televised political debates were set up to
resemble television game shows with the two contestants

vying for the grand prize (the presidency), the journalists

acting as the emcees, and television audiences looking for
positive or negative reactions from the "contestants"
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depending upon how the game was going for them.

Brevity of

response and spontaneity were expected, and these factors

became more prominent during televised presidential debates
between 1960 and 1992.

In the first Kennedy-Nixon debate, commentator HowaM^^^
K. Smith informed the audience that each candidate would be

allowed "an opening statement of approximately eight
minutes' duration and a closing statement of approximately

three minutes' duration" (New York Times. September 27,
i960, 28).

There was also a three-minute time allotment for

responding to questions.

It is indicative of Nixon's

misunderstanding of the television audience's desire for
entertainment and brevity when he responded to reportersv
after the debate, that "the three-minute limitation on

answering questions was not sufficient to develop a point"

(New York Times. September 27, 1960, 28).

Nixop W^^

mistaken in placing issues over image.
In the second presidential debate of 1992, moderator
Carole Simpson told the audience that each candidate would

be allowed two minutes for a closing statement but did not

inform them of any response time allotments.

However, one

of her main duties that night was to continually inform each
candidate toward the end of his response time that it was

time to close. These time reminders increased in frequency
from the middle of the debate to the end and included such
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interuptions as:

"Very briefly," "Sorry to cut you short,"

"One brief point?" "Brief," "Can you wrap it up?" "I'm

sorry, I'm going to have to...," "I don't want to sound-bite

you, but...," "We have just a little bit of time left...."
Listening to this type of time management of the
candidates' responses, a viewer might either feel grateful
that the moderator was shortening the statements or anxious

that there might not be enough time left to hear all that
the candidates had to say.

Either way, the tenor of the

debate was that of a race against time, which allowed voters
to judge how the candidates reacted to interruptions and
time pressures.

It also informed the viewers of whether a

candidate could

think on his feet" and get to the point

quickly.

Interestingly, none of the three candidates

complained (at least in public) that they were not given

enough time to sufficiently develop their answers.

They

perhaps realized that voters were judging how they presented

themselves, not necessarily what they said.
By comparison, the 1960 debate was almost sedate due to
the total lack of interruptions by speakers except the

instance of Kennedy stopping a reporter's questions in order
to correct him.

There were no such interruptions of

candidates by Howard K. Smith to remind them that their time

was up.

This lack of interruptions had the effect of

lending an extremely formal tone to the 1960 debate.
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Regardless of the changes In political discoufse that
have been effected by television, some rhetorical principles
remain constant.

One of these factors is the reluctance of

candidates to appear too aggressive when attacking an
opppnent Oh policy or character issues.

Offensive tactics

thai: are overdone or wrongly timed cause the voters to

unsympathetic towards the petoetrator.

This is one of the

reasons why candidates request moderators and refuse a faceoff in televised debates.

Bennett proposes three pragmatic rules that govern
personal attacks within political discourse and that have

remained constant within this century.

These rules are:

"(a) one uses offensive formats when one is the underdog,
(b) one uses defensive formats when one is the front runner,
and (c) one claims to be above these personal concerns at
all times" (225).

Bennett explains the skill involved in

following these conflict rules when he writes:

"These

symbolic tests of personal mettle involve substantial
precision in rhetorical format" (225-226).

one eto^Pi® of h political candidate who failed to
follow the ritualistic rules of political discourse is

Robert Dole during the 1976 vice presidential debates.

Dole's answers contained "sarcasm, gratuitous humor, and,
more often than customary in political discourse, an

impugning of his opponents' integrity" (Jamieson,
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Presidential Debates. l51).

Because Dole went beyond

necessary limits in attacking his opponent, he violated

voters' sense of proi)riety concerning political discourse.
CphsSquently, Dole'S erroneous judgment in how to publicly

conduct himself reflected badly on his image as a potential
president.

Voters could not place theitconfiden

in a

candidate who approached problems (including opponents) in
such a negative manner.

The error of his offensive attacks

was obvious in a statement he made in 1988 when he was

running for president:
I did.

"They told me to go forVthS jugular.

My own" (USA Today. November 9, 1987, 4A).

Rubin conveys a sense of Kennedy's and Nixon's

reluctance to appear too confrpntstional in their first
debate when he quotes Russell Biaker as commenting that the
two men "argued genteelly"

and that the two candidates'

"exchanges were distinguished by suavity, earnestness and
courtesy that suggested that the two men were more concerned
about 'image projection' to their...television audience than
about scoring debate points" (53-54).
certainly Nixon did not want to look confrontational,

but this was not so much a case of image projection as
protecting his image.

M

understand what a

television camera could do to his image, much less do for
it.

Even without the cameras, Nixon would probably have

been polite because this was his natural demeanor in
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conducting business.

However, Kennedy wae on bis best

behavidr, because re

were; that his private

conversations were filled with curse words, off-color

remarks and ranting criticisms of his critics, especially

the media when they portrayed hi^

a bad way.

Ih the second 1992 presidential debate, two audience

members requested that the caindidates stop "trashing their
ppponents' character" and "focus on the issues and not the

personality and the mud." Since these guestipns were among
the first four posed to the candidates, and no
Gonfrontations had yet occurred, it must be assumed that the

questioners were basing their requests upon the candidates'

ads and the news sound bites that they had been subjected to
thus far in the campaign.

Howeyer, these requests did effectively dampen any
aggressive confrontations that might have occurred in the

debate and put the candidates in a position of having to

address any subtle accusations or insinuations about them by
setting the record straight (in an offended tone) rather

than reacting with accusations against their opponent.

Perot insinuated that Clinton paid otljefs: tb ;do h

when

thinking

for him, Clinton defended himself saying, "Wait a minute.

I

want to say just one thing hw, Ross, in fairness

ideas I express are mine...." When Clinton implied that the
Republicans had allowed the deficit to build up for twelve
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years and proposed a plan to fix it, Bush responded in a

victimized manner saying

"Well, I'm a little cohfused here,

hecause 1 don't see how you can grow the deficit down by
raising people's taxes."

Bush was pleading confusion to

appear victimized/ but h^ was, in reality, implying that
Clinton's plan was ineffective.

Both Clinton's and Bush's

response to a subtle attack was to victimize themselves and,
in a proper tone of voice, give their version of the facts.

Certainly, it can be said that the format of these

televised debates minimize occasions for clashes between
candidates.

The insertion of a questioner or moderator to

which the candidates respond enables the candidates to avoid

a direct face-off.

Swerdlow gives credence to this view

When he writes

Much of the controversy surrounding debates
concerns format: Should there be a moderator?

How

about eliminating the panel of questioners? Why
not just put the candidates on stage alone and let
them confront each other?

Those who ask such

questions usually assume that more truth and

better information will emerge from a face-to-face
meeting without intermediaries.

But in the real

world candidates do not want—and have not

accepted—face-to-face confrontations. Such
confrontations, they fear, could force them to
appear unpresidential or overly aggressive....
Debates also document the fact that face-to-face

meetings...can easily digress into distracting
pettiness (141).
American voters have never seen a televised presidential
debate in which the candidates face-off on the issues

without an intermediary.

Therefore, they do not expect it.
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A debate moderator gives the impression that the debate is

controlled— that important issues will be raisedy that each

Candidate's time will be fairly allotted, and that tiie

;

debate will move along at a good pace and not become

stalemated on one issue.

Leaving out the adderatbr might

cause voters to feel uneasy about which candidate is contrbi
of the debate.

With the moderator, voters cah focus their

attention on how candidates respond to the questions rather

than how the debate is being conducted. ;
At any rate, these "joint press conferences" as they
have been called, give the voters a unique opportunity to

judge presidential candidates upon their governing ability
and knowledge of the issues.

McKinnon, Tedesco and Raid, in

their study of the 1^92 presidential debates, write;
y

^

Research has concluded that debates have the

ability to educate and inform voters, to influence
perceptions of candidates, and to impact voting
preference and behavior.... Mediated debates
provide viewers or listeners with glimpses of the

candidate ab a pebspn and how the cahdidates, if
elected, will shape our society and culture" (117
IIS).
The majority of voters, when they watch a televised

presidential debate, are, indeed^ using the event to judge

how a candidate will govern if elected.

The mariher in which

a candidate proposes to solve various contemporary problems
is not as important a factor as how the candidate responds
to stress, frames his responses, and interacts with the
other candidate(s).

98

The proposals for governing that a candidate offers can
be changed or shelved once that person takes office.

But

voters have learned that a person's propensity to act
certain ways in given situations does not change when he or
she takes office.

This is why voters now put more stress

upon judging what sort of person the candidate seems to be
rather than listening to what a candidate says.

This is

also why a candidate's creation of a positive image to meet
the demands of the voters is of utmost importance.
When John F. Kennedy used the media to promote his
image, American voters were dazzled by a display they had
never before witnessed in a political candidate, only in

Hollywood stars, whose business is make-believe.

Certainly,

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced the idea of a

president becoming intimate with his constituents when he
broadcast his "fireside chats" over the radio and appeared
on the cinema in movie theaters.

Yet Kennedy took that

intimacy with the public one step further when he appeared
on television in the debates, promoted himself visually in
television commercials, and invited photographers to record

supposedly private moments with his wife and child.
Since Kennedy's media display in 1960, voters have come
to expect this access to political candidates.

A public

grown cynical over government scandals has come to rely on
how a candidate presents him or herself to judge how that
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person will govern.

It is no longer of utmost importance

what a candidate says but, rather, who that candidate says

he or she is.

Thus, a candidate now, naturally, employs

Burke's rhetorical theory of "identification" in which an
image of him or herself is created for the voters to

identify with.

The televised presidential debates are an

essential part of candidates' display of their image, when
voters will either have their judgment of candidates

confirmed or finally decided.
Televised presidential debates have now become the norm
in the American political system because voters demand this
close, somewhat spontaneous presentation of the candidates

in order to make their most informed judgment.

Voters'

current uncertainty about the objectivity of press coverage

of the candidates, as well as the extreme nonobjectivity of
campaign ads, have left the televised debates as the only
arena in which they can judge for themselves the merits of
the candidates.

If the current trend in the style and format of the

televised presidential debates continues, voters can expect
to see informality, brevity and minimized confronations in .

these nationwide presentations by the candidates.
Additionally, voters who have learned that a candidate's
mental and ethical traits are of the utmost importance in
determining that person's ability to govern, will demand
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more, and possibly, new ways of judging candidates'
capabilities.

This demand by voters will, in turn, cause

candidates to seek out even more effective ways of
determining, creating, and projecting an image of themselves
that will fulfill the voters' expectations.
Clearly, both Kennedy and Clinton entered their

respective presidential races with the negative factors of

low recognition, youth, and inexperience standing between
them and the presidency.

Yet, they were both, through their

careful preparation of an image to meet voters'

expectations, able to turn those negatives into positive

images of youth and energy, capitalizing on America's
periodic tendency to reinvent itself.

Each man's careful

construction of an image that could meet America's

expectations resulted in a victory against great odds that
could be called a "triumph of timing and temperament"

(Morrow 24).

Kennedy captured America's imagination with

his "New Frontier" and Clinton reproduced that success with
his "New Generation."

The famous photograph, showing President Kennedy
shaking hands with a 16-year-old Bill Clinton in the Rose

Garden, was used by the Clinton campaign as proof of
"passing the torch."

The implication was that an aura of

leadership and approval had been passed from Kennedy to
Clinton.

However, the reality of what Kennedy gave to
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Clinton (as well as other successful presidential candidates
after 1950) was an understanding of how to create an image

that would meet America's expectations and how to use
television to project that image.
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